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For over a hundred years, the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a 
coherent test for analyzing constitutional challenges based on vagueness. The cur-
rent formulation of the vagueness test is rooted in due process principles and calls 
for invalidation of laws when they either (1) fail to “give a person of ordinary intel-
ligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden” by the law, or (2) en-
courage “arbitrary arrests and convictions.” Certain aspects of this test suggest that 
the separation of powers is relevant to the analysis. Nevertheless, it is currently un-
clear what role this constitutional protection plays. 
Recent Supreme Court decisions highlight the lack of guidance that the current 
due process test provides. This Comment “clarifies” vagueness by analyzing the con-
stitutional purposes of the doctrine and proposing a framework that produces more 
consistent and predictable results. In particular, this Comment analyzes how due 
process and separation-of-powers considerations should inform each prong of the 
modern vagueness test. Borrowing from elements of originalist as well as legal- 
realist scholarship, the proposed framework, entitled the “Structure and Rights Ap-
proach,” sets forth a test that reinforces the symbolic importance of both constitu-
tional protections while strengthening the practical application of the test. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the Supreme Court resolved two cases involving the 
vagueness doctrine. This doctrine permits the Court to strike 
down legislation that violates due process because it either 
(1) fails to give “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of 
what is prohibited” (the “fair notice” prong), or (2) is “so standard-
less that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory en-
forcement” (the “arbitrary enforcement” prong).1 In both cases the 
Court applied this due process test and refrained from invalidat-
ing the particular legislation in question. Nevertheless, the two 
opinions portrayed dramatically different visions of the doctrine, 
highlighting the inconsistent nature of the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence in this area. 
In Holder v Humanitarian Law Project,2 decided on June 21, 
2010, the Court reversed a lower court decision that held the term 
“service” in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 20043 (IRTPA) was unconstitutionally vague.4 The Court ap-
proached the doctrine narrowly, using as-applied review5 and fo-
cusing only on the fair notice prong of the vagueness test.6 How-
ever, on June 24, 2010, just three days after the Humanitarian 
Law Project decision, the Court painted a very different picture of 
 
 1 Federal Communications Commission v Fox Television Stations, Inc, 567 US 239, 
253 (2012), quoting United States v Williams, 553 US 285, 304 (2008). 
 2 561 US 1 (2010). 
 3 Pub L No 108-458, 118 Stat 3638. For the “service” provision, see 18 USC 
§ 2339A(b)(1). 
 4 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US at 40. 
 5 For a discussion of the distinction between “as-applied” and “facial” review, see 
text accompanying notes 24–29. 
 6 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US at 20. 
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the doctrine. In Skilling v United States,7 the Court facially re-
viewed the constitutionality of the federal honest-services statute,8 
analyzing the statute under both prongs of the vagueness test. It 
ultimately concluded that this statute too was constitutional.9 
These two cases reveal the foundational uncertainty within 
the modern vagueness doctrine while also illustrating its consist-
encies. In terms of consistency, both cases embody modern courts’ 
general acceptance of the possibility for facial review in vague-
ness challenges. And though the Court used the modern vague-
ness doctrine’s two prongs inconsistently, when read together 
they demonstrate the doctrine’s emphasis on due process as its 
constitutional justification. At the same time, these two cases, de-
cided within a three-day window, also demonstrate the problems 
with the modern doctrine’s due process foundation. The Court es-
sentially applied two different vagueness doctrines. Both were ap-
parently justified by due process but included an inevitable  
separation-of-powers influence that the Court did not explicitly 
recognize. This uncertainty as to the doctrine’s constitutional 
foundation has created ambiguity regarding the doctrine’s scope 
that is emblematic of the Court’s guidance on the doctrine gener-
ally. Cases such as Humanitarian Law Project and Skilling have 
led commentators to liken the doctrine to the “I know it when I 
see it” test,10 a process that begins with a conclusion and works 
backward to find support.11 Given the lack of clear guidance from 
the Supreme Court, it is not surprising that lower courts struggle 
to apply the doctrine.12 
Many scholars have suggested revisions to make the vague-
ness test more consistent and predictable.13 Yet none have  
 
 7 561 US 358 (2010). 
 8 18 USC § 1346. 
 9 Skilling, 561 US at 412–13. The honest-services statute proscribes fraudulent dep-
rivations of “the intangible right of honest services.” 18 USC § 1346. 
 10 See John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in 
American Criminal Laws, 80 Denver U L Rev 241, 243 (2002), citing Jacobellis v Ohio, 
378 US 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart concurring) (using the phrase “I know it when I see it” as 
applied to the definition of hard-core pornography). 
 11 Decker, 80 Denver U L Rev at 243 (cited in note 10). 
 12 See Part III.D for a discussion of Guerrero v Whitaker, 705 F3d 1031 (9th Cir 2013), 
a case in which the Ninth Circuit unknowingly misapplied Supreme Court precedent due 
to the convoluted nature of the vagueness doctrine. 
 13 See, for example, Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 Am J Crim L 279, 313 (2003) (suggesting that the arbitrary 
enforcement prong “be modified to bar only statutes that, in light of the circumstances 
surrounding their adoption, encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement”); Cristina 
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analyzed how the two prongs of the current test connect to the 
doctrine’s constitutional purpose. The Supreme Court currently 
claims the purpose of the vagueness doctrine is due process,14 
which is primarily concerned with treating individuals fairly. 
Nevertheless, the Court has occasionally referenced the need to 
constrain law enforcement,15 which is a separation-of-powers is-
sue.16 The Court, however, does not explicitly mention the sepa-
ration of powers in its analysis. By rhetorically invoking due pro-
cess but implicitly integrating elements of the separation of 
powers, the Supreme Court conflated two different constitutional 
purposes in its purportedly unitary due process test. Clarifying 
the doctrine’s constitutional roots and evaluating how they 
should inform the vagueness analysis is important for under-
standing how the vagueness doctrine should be applied. The goal 
of this Comment is to do just that. 
More specifically, this Comment analyzes how due process 
and the separation of powers influence the vagueness doctrine 
and suggests a framework that clarifies its constitutional pur-
poses. The goal of the proposed framework is to provide a more 
consistent, objective, and accessible approach for lower courts. 
Given the exceedingly (and ironically) vague and convoluted na-
ture of the current vagueness test, any clarification will help 
guide courts in determining when and how to apply the doctrine. 
Before diving into the crux of this Comment, it is helpful to 
define a few terms used throughout. This Comment uses the term 
“invalidate” to refer to when the Supreme Court strikes down leg-
islation it deems unconstitutional regardless of whether the 
Court invalidates the entire statute, a provision within the stat-
ute, or even a single phrase within a provision.17 If a law is  
invalidated, it is not applied in any future case. Invalidation only 
 
D. Lockwood, Creating Ambiguity in the Void for Vagueness Doctrine by Avoiding a Vague-
ness Determination in Review of Federal Laws, 65 Syracuse L Rev 395, 447–49 (2015) 
(suggesting a merger of the fair notice and arbitrary enforcement prongs and limiting the 
test to as-applied review); Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal  
Statutes–Balancing Acts, 5 Va J Soc Pol & L 1, 25–26 (1997) (suggesting the addition of a 
balancing test to the fair notice and arbitrary enforcement prongs). 
 14 See Sessions v Dimaya, 138 S Ct 1204, 1212 (2018). 
 15 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495, 529–42 (1935); 
Cline v Frink Dairy Co, 274 US 445, 457–58 (1927); United States v L. Cohen Grocery Co, 
255 US 81, 90–91 (1921). See also Goldsmith, 30 Am J Crim L at 284–85 (cited in note 13). 
 16 See also text accompanying note 74. 
 17 See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Means to an 
End, 109 U Pa L Rev 67, 86 (1960). The law of severance, which determines whether an 
enactment will be invalidated in whole or in part, is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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occurs when the Supreme Court performs “facial” review. That is, 
when the Court reviews a law to determine whether it is “totally 
invalid and incapable of any constitutional application.”18 Unlike 
a facial challenge, which allows an attack on the enactment itself, 
an “as applied” challenge attacks an application of the enactment 
to a particular defendant.19 If an “as applied” challenge succeeds, 
the enactment will simply not be applied to that particular  
defendant. 
As Humanitarian Law Project and Skilling demonstrate, the 
Court has not been consistent when selecting what type of review 
applies in vagueness cases. Even so, courts tend to apply facial 
review in this context. For this reason, this Comment focuses on 
facial review as the prevailing modern standard used by courts.20 
The proposed framework, however, suggests the type of review 
should depend on which constitutional protection (due process or 
the separation of powers) is in play.21 
Part I of this Comment evaluates the constitutional purpose 
of the vagueness doctrine and argues that the vagueness test 
should clarify the due process and separation-of-powers compo-
nents of the analysis. Part I.A looks to the current application of 
the doctrine in two seminal vagueness cases, Papachristou v City 
of Jacksonville22 and Sessions v Dimaya,23 to show the problematic 
nature of the current test. Part I.B describes the conceptual and 
practical differences between due process and separation of pow-
ers in order to highlight why this distinction matters. Part I.C an-
alyzes early American cases and writings, revealing that vague-
ness was originally understood to violate both due process and the 
separation of powers. This Section argues that due process grew 
out of the separation of powers, which explains the overlapping 
nature of these concepts in current cases, as well as the modern 
Court’s eventual favoring of due process in the current doctrine. 
Part I.D then compares Papachristou to early American cases and 
commentaries, revealing that the arbitrary enforcement prong of 
the current test may actually be a “hybrid” protection implicating 
 
 18 Decker, 80 Denver U L Rev at 275 (cited in note 10). 
 19 Id at 280. 
 20 For a discussion of the distinction between as-applied and facial review in the 
vagueness context, see Lockwood, 65 Syracuse L Rev at 433–47 (cited in note 13). 
 21 See Part III. 
 22 405 US 156 (1972). 
 23 138 S Ct 1204 (2018). 
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both due process and the separation of powers. This Section ar-
gues the current formulation of the test confuses due process and 
separation-of-powers elements and thus needs to be clarified. 
Part II evaluates the practical issue of when and how to in-
validate a vague law—what this Comment refers to as the “how 
vague is too vague” question. This question is closely related to 
whether a law should be reviewed facially or as applied, as only 
facial review leads to invalidation. The Court’s precedent pro-
vides two conflicting approaches to determining “how vague is too 
vague.” These approaches provide the basis for a recurring debate 
among certain members of the Court. Articulating the minority 
approach, Justice Clarence Thomas has maintained that invali-
dation is inappropriate unless a law is vague in all applications.24 
Justice Thomas explains that facial review should be applied only 
when asking whether there is an “unmistakable core” of behavior 
prohibited by the statute.25 In all other circumstances, Justice 
Thomas believes that the Court should take a case-by-case ap-
proach, reviewing whether the statute was inappropriately ap-
plied to a defendant (as-applied review).26 Articulating the major-
ity approach, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by the more liberal 
justices, rejected the idea that facial review is appropriate only 
when the law is vague in all applications.27 Instead of an “unmis-
takable core” dictating when facial review is appropriate, Justice 
Scalia reviewed all vagueness issues on their face.28 This broad 
application of facial review is how the vagueness doctrine is cur-
rently applied in the majority of cases.29 
Part III proposes a three-step framework for evaluating 
vagueness, described as the “Structure and Rights Approach” for 
 
 24 City of Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41, 112 (1999) (Thomas dissenting). 
 25 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1250, 1252 (Thomas dissenting) (“[I]f facial vagueness chal-
lenges are ever appropriate, I adhere to my view that a law is not facially vague, ‘[i]f any 
fool would know that a particular category of conduct would be within the reach of the 
statute, if there is an “unmistakable core” that a reasonable person would know is forbid-
den by the law.’”) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Morales, 527 US at 112 (Thomas 
dissenting). For an elaboration on what Justice Thomas considers an “unmistakable core,” 
see Parts II.A and III.A. 
 26 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1250, 1252. 
 27 Johnson v United States, 135 S Ct 2551, 2561 (2015). 
 28 Id (“If we hold a statute to be vague, it is vague in all its applications (and never 
mind the reality).”). 
 29 As previously mentioned, the Court has not been consistent in articulating a ra-
tionale for why facial review is appropriate in this setting. For a discussion of the different 
rationales for facial review, see Lockwood, 65 Syracuse L Rev at 433–47 (cited in note 13). 
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the way in which it distinguishes between the types of constitu-
tional violations. “Structure” represents the separation-of-powers 
element as it arises from the structure of the Constitution. 
“Rights” represents the due process element as it arises from the 
Fifth Amendment. Borrowing elements from originalist analysis 
as well as from legal realist scholars such as Justice Oliver  
Wendell Holmes Jr, this test attempts to both accommodate the 
symbolic value of these constitutional protections and provide a 
workable framework for taking into account the imperfections of 
judges. More specifically, the approach addresses vagueness from 
a practical perspective, attempting to improve the current doc-
trine but by no means presenting a flawless framework. Rather, 
the test accounts for imperfection on the part of judges by includ-
ing a “back stop” in Step Three for laws that may not obviously 
violate due process or separation of powers but result in arbitrary 
enforcement nonetheless. Part III.D then takes Guerrero v  
Whitaker,30 a recently decided Ninth Circuit case, and applies the 
Structure and Rights Approach to its facts to show how the pro-
posed framework clarifies the doctrine. 
I.  LOCATING THE SOURCE OF THE VAGUENESS DOCTRINE: DUE 
PROCESS, SEPARATION OF POWERS, OR BOTH? 
A. The Current Vagueness Approach: Papachristou and 
Dimaya 
This Comment focuses on two prominent Supreme Court de-
cisions as proxies for evaluating the vagueness doctrine. The first 
case, Papachristou, is a landmark decision that provides an ex-
ample of how the Court applies the doctrine. The second case,  
Dimaya (decided over four decades later), is the Court’s most re-
cent ruling applying the vagueness doctrine and highlights the 
need to rethink the vagueness framework. These opinions further 
illustrate the modern vagueness doctrine’s essential “due process 
test” character, as neither of these opinions emphasizes a  
separation-of-powers justification. Rather, the Supreme Court 
applies the due process test by focusing on (1) a failure to “give a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated 
conduct is forbidden by the statute,”31 and (2) the encouragement 
 
 30 908 F3d 541 (9th Cir 2018). 
 31 Papachristou, 405 US at 162, quoting United States v Harriss, 347 US 612,  
617 (1954). 
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of “arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.”32 These factors 
are known as the fair notice and arbitrary enforcement prongs, 
and a statute need only meet one to be unconstitutionally vague 
under the modern test.33 Although prior versions of the test fo-
cused more on fair notice, the Court has come to rely more heavily 
on arbitrary enforcement.34 As Papachristou and Dimaya high-
light, the Court has failed to outline sufficient guidelines for ap-
plication of the vagueness doctrine, causing it to become as im-
precise as the laws it seeks to invalidate.35 The lack of coherent 
guidance results from the Supreme Court’s misattribution of the 
constitutional purpose for the vagueness doctrine to due process 
alone. Until the Court explicitly recognizes the role of the separa-
tion of powers and integrates that role into the vagueness test, 
the doctrine will remain confused. 
Papachristou was the first time the Supreme Court cited ar-
bitrary enforcement as a prominent component of the vagueness 
analysis.36 The case concerned a vagrancy ordinance in  
Jacksonville, Florida, which allowed the arrest of individuals for 
behaviors such as “[n]ightwalking,” “loafing,” “wandering or 
strolling . . . without any lawful purpose or object,” and “habitu-
ally . . . frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold 
 
 32 Papachristou, 405 US at 162, citing Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940) and 
Herndon v Lowry, 301 US 242 (1937). 
 33 See Christina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the 
Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 Cardozo Pub L Pol & Ethics J 255, 257–58 (2010);  
Goldsmith, 30 Am J Crim L at 288, 290 (cited in note 13). See also, for example, Nova 
Records, Inc v Sendak, 706 F2d 782, 789 (7th Cir 1983). 
 34 See Goldsmith, 30 Am J Crim L at 288–89 (cited in note 13) (explaining the rise, 
and eventual preeminence, of the arbitrary enforcement prong); Debra Livingston, Police 
Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New 
Policing, 97 Colum L Rev 551, 560–61 (1997) (arguing that the rise in the use of the arbi-
trary enforcement prong has limited the effectiveness of modern public-order laws); 
Kolender v Lawson, 461 US 352, 358 (1983) (describing that the more important aspect of 
the doctrine “is not actual notice, but . . . the requirement that the legislature establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement”), quoting Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566, 
574 (1974). 
 35 See Winters v New York, 333 US 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter dissenting) (describ-
ing unconstitutional indefiniteness as “itself an indefinite concept”); Mark Kelman, Inter-
pretative Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan L Rev 591, 660 (1981) 
(noting that judicial review of vagueness is administered “in a very un-rule-like fashion”); 
Note, 109 U Pa L Rev at 70–71 (cited in note 17) (describing vagueness decisions as habit-
ually lacking informed reasoning). 
 36 Papachristou, 405 US at 162. See also Goldsmith, 30 Am J Crim L at 288 (cited in 
note 13). Some scholars contend that the arbitrary enforcement prong was merely “implicit 
in Papachristou and made apparent in subsequent cases.” Livingston, 97 Colum L Rev at 
604 (cited in note 34). 
2019] Clarifying Vagueness 2309 
 
or served.”37 Performing a facial review of the ordinance, the 
Court explained that the legislature had cast a net “so all-inclu-
sive and generalized” that it enabled “men to be caught who are 
vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution, alt-
hough not chargeable with any particular offense.”38 At any given 
time, a police officer could find any person guilty of at least some 
behavior described in the statute. Because of this “unfettered dis-
cretion” in determining whether an individual was in violation of 
the law, the ordinance created a regime in which poor people 
could stand on a public sidewalk only at the whim of a police of-
ficer.39 If applied literally, the prohibition on “‘frequenting . . . 
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served’ would [ ] em-
brace many members of golf clubs and city clubs,” who were likely 
not being targeted.40 Because the ordinance was not applied 
equally to residents of the city, and likely never would be, a unan-
imous Court struck down the ordinance.41 The opinion denounced 
“unfettered discretion”; however, the Court failed to provide a 
framework for determining how much discretion police should be 
afforded.42 
While the Court mentioned the notice prong of the due pro-
cess test, its reasoning rested primarily on arbitrary enforce-
ment.43 The formal and shallow nature of the notice requirement 
may explain this result. For one, the well-settled principle that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse for violation of the law means 
that actual notice is not required under due process; instead, the 
court asks whether “a person of ordinary intelligence” would have 
 
 37 Papachristou, 405 US at 163–64. 
 38 Id at 166, quoting Winters v New York, 333 US 507, 540 (Frankfurter dissenting). 
Although rhetorically the Court rests on a due process analysis, this quote shows how, 
conceptually, the separation of powers sneaks into the reasoning. As will be explained in 
the next Section, the separation of powers revolves around the need for the legislature to 
provide clear enforcement guidelines. If the legislature enacts a law that is too broad, the 
executive and judiciary are left to define what the law actually means, potentially violat-
ing the separation of powers. See Part II.B. For more information about how the separa-
tion of powers sneaks into the Court’s analysis, see text accompanying note 122. 
 39 See Papachristou, 405 US at 168, 170. 
 40 Id at 164. 
 41 Papachristou, 405 US at 171. Notice how the Court’s discussion in Papachristou 
does not focus on the conduct of the actual defendants in the case. Rather, it speaks gen-
erally to the issue of determining how to apply the law and the potential for abuse. 
 42 Id at 168. 
 43 More than two-thirds of the opinion is dedicated to a discussion of arbitrary en-
forcement. See id at 164–71. 
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notice.44 Further, fair notice does not require criminal statutes to 
be precise on their face. Rather, judicial construction can clarify 
facial uncertainty, therefore requiring “a person of ordinary intel-
ligence” to mine legal precedent if they want to anticipate a 
court’s decision.45 Because of these qualities of the notice require-
ment, courts interpreting the vagueness doctrine may have come 
to lean more heavily on arbitrary enforcement. 
Papachristou shows how the modern Supreme Court thinks 
about vagueness: it leans on due process. Dimaya, on the other 
hand, highlights the difficulty of applying the vagueness doctrine 
framework. The case involved the Immigration and Nationality 
Act46 (INA), which rendered deportable “any alien convicted of an 
‘aggravated felony.’”47 Performing a facial review, the Supreme 
Court took issue with a “residual clause” within the INA’s defini-
tion of “aggravated felony,” meant as a catchall for any felony not 
specifically listed in the statute. The clause covered any offense 
that, “by its nature, involve[d] a substantial risk that physical 
force . . . may be used” in the commission of the offense.48 The 
question presented was whether the INA’s residual clause 
reached defendant Dimaya’s two residential burglary convic-
tions.49 In a series of earlier cases, the Supreme Court adopted the 
“categorical approach” in evaluating this residual clause, an ap-
proach that requires courts to consider the “ordinary case” of a 
category of crimes, rather than looking to the actual facts.50 In 
Dimaya, the Court’s task was to determine whether the ordinary 
case of residential burglary “by its nature” involved a “substantial 
risk [of] physical force.”51 Before answering this question, how-
ever, the Supreme Court facially reviewed the residual clause and 
invalidated it.52 
 
 44 John Calvin Jeffries Jr, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Stat-
utes, 71 Va L Rev 189, 208–09 (1985). 
 45 See Kolender, 461 US at 355 (“In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a 
federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or en-
forcement agency has proffered.”), quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc, 455 US 489, 494 n 5 (1982). 
 46 Pub L No 82-414, 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq. 
 47 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1210, citing 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 48 18 USC § 16(b). 
 49 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1211. 
 50 See id, citing Leocal v Ashcroft, 543 US 1, 7 (2004). 
 51 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1211, citing James v United States, 550 US 192, 208 (2007) 
and 8 USC § 16(b). 
 52 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1213. 
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Extending a prior decision in which the Court invalidated a 
similarly worded residual clause in the Armed Criminal Career 
Act of 198453 (ACCA), the Court concluded that two aspects of the 
INA’s residual clause “conspire to make it unconstitutionally 
vague.”54 First, the residual clause created “uncertainty about 
how to estimate the risk posed by a crime.”55 This uncertainty un-
derscores the difficulty in determining an imagined “ordinary 
case” rather than looking to real-world facts: How does one know 
what the ordinary case of a crime is? Does the ordinary case of 
witness tampering involve bribing the witness or threatening vi-
olence? Should a court limit its inquiry to the ordinary case in a 
particular city or state as opposed to the ordinary case on a na-
tionwide basis? The residual clause, the Court concluded, offered 
“no reliable way” to choose between competing accounts.56 
Second, the residual clause created “uncertainty about how 
much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.”57 
Many criminal statutes require courts to apply a “substantial 
risk” standard to real-world facts. The problem with the INA’s re-
sidual clause, however, was the application of this standard to a 
“judge-imagined abstraction” of the ordinary case of a crime, ef-
fectively layering two aspects of uncertainty.58 Neither the “sub-
stantial risk” standard nor the “judge-imagined abstraction” prin-
ciple would be unconstitutional alone. Nevertheless, the Court 
held that, by combining uncertainty as to how to measure risk 
with uncertainty as to how much risk it takes to qualify as a  
 
 53 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2185, codified at 18 USC § 924(e). See Johnson v United 
States, 135 S Ct 2551, 2557 (2015); Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1213 (explaining that applying 
the holding from Johnson to 8 USC § 16(b) was “straightforward”). 
 54 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1213, quoting Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2557–58. 
 55 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1213. 
 56 Id at 1214, quoting Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2558. 
 57 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1214, quoting Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2558. 
 58 See Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1216, quoting Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2558. Take, for exam-
ple, burglary, which requires entering into a home with the intent to commit a crime. 
“Entering” may involve forcible entry or not, “crime” may mean theft or murder, and all of 
this may happen when the “home” is occupied or not. If the “ordinary case” of burglary 
involves nonforcible entry into a home while someone is currently home with intent to 
steal jewelry, it is unclear whether this involves a “substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used.” 8 USC § 16(b). In this ordinary 
case, is the homeowner awake? Does the burglar bring a weapon? All of those questions 
are answered in real world cases, but they remain unresolved in analyzing the “ordinary 
case,” making it impossible to answer the question of whether the “ordinary case” involves 
a “substantial risk.” 
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violent felony, the residual clause “produce[d] . . . more unpredict-
ability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.”59 
The Court concluded that the combination of these layers of un-
certainty violated both the fair notice and arbitrary enforcement 
prongs of the modern vagueness doctrine test.60 The Court did not, 
however, elaborate on how the residual clause connects to each 
prong, creating ambiguity for lower courts attempting to apply 
the test. 
In his Dimaya dissent, Justice Thomas questioned the 
Court’s use of the vagueness doctrine. As a notorious opponent of 
substantive due process, Justice Thomas suggested it was not a 
coincidence that the vagueness doctrine developed concurrently 
with the idea of due process as a constitutional protection.61 Ref-
erencing both substantive due process and the vagueness doc-
trine, Justice Thomas described the Court’s “bad habit of invoking 
the Due Process Clause to constitutionalize rules that were tradi-
tionally left to the democratic process.”62 If the vagueness doctrine 
had any roots in the Constitution, which he doubted, Justice 
Thomas posited that they would be in the separation of powers 
rather than due process.63 He explained, “I assume that, at some 
point, a statute could be so devoid of content that a court tasked 
with interpreting it ‘would simply be making up a law—that is, 
exercising legislative power.’”64 
Justice Thomas also questioned the practice of facial review. 
“[I]f the vagueness doctrine has any basis in . . . the Due Process 
Clause,” Justice Thomas suggested “it must be limited to case-by-
case challenges to particular applications of a statute.”65 The 
“case-by-case” approach is essentially synonymous with as- 
applied review. This view derives from Justice Thomas’s belief 
 
 59 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1216, quoting Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2558. While the Court’s 
holding was limited to the INA’s residual clause, the question of whether other laws that 
possess the double uncertainty of a “serious potential risk” standard and “judge-imagined 
abstraction” principle are unconstitutionally vague remains open. The Ninth Circuit re-
cently suggested that, although the Supreme Court had yet to extend the principle past 
the residual clause context, the use of the categorical approach as applied to California’s 
felony murder rule was plausibly unconstitutionally vague. See Henry v Spearman, 899 
F3d 703, 708, 710–11 (9th Cir 2018). 
 60 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1223. 
 61 Id at 1244 (Thomas dissenting). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id at 1248–50 (“[P]erhaps the vagueness doctrine is really a way to enforce the 
separation of powers—specifically the doctrine of nondelegation.”). 
 64 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1249 (Thomas dissenting), quoting Gary Lawson, Delegation 
and Original Meaning, 88 Va L Rev 327, 339 (2002). 
 65 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1250 (Thomas dissenting). 
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that as-applied review is more in line with the practice of the 
early American courts.66 
Because Justice Thomas is one of the few Supreme Court jus-
tices to announce a consistent view of the vagueness doctrine, his 
arguments are important to evaluate. While this Comment does 
not focus on originalist analysis, it does evaluate the method of 
review (facial or as-applied) used by early American courts, as 
well as which constitutional justifications (due process or separa-
tion of powers) these courts used. The modern doctrine’s pro-
nounced emphasis on due process, combined with the subtle, in-
evitable influence of separation of powers, has created a doctrine 
with unclear scope. Inquiring as to how early courts grounded 
their vagueness doctrine and drawing out distinctions can inform 
present day attempts to clarify the vagueness doctrine. If early 
courts’ reasoning is convincing, it may justify adopting certain as-
pects in the modern vagueness test. But before getting to that dis-
cussion, the next Section evaluates why the debate between a due 
process and separation-of-powers justification even matters. 
B. Due Process versus Separation of Powers: Conceptual and 
Practical Differences 
Whether the vagueness doctrine is rooted in due process or 
the separation of powers determines the scope of the doctrine as 
well as the underlying analysis. For example, the separation of 
powers applies only to federal law whereas due process applies to 
both federal and state law. Which laws the vagueness doctrine 
can invalidate therefore depends on identifying the doctrine’s con-
stitutional source. For this reason, locating these concepts in the 
Constitution and analyzing the conceptual and practical differ-
ences between them is crucial to evaluating the vagueness doc-
trine generally. 
Due process is understood as a fundamental protection 
against unreasonable government interference depriving individ-
uals of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.”67 
This protection is found in the Fifth Amendment, which applies 
to the federal government, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which applies to the states.68 The separation of powers is the idea 
 
 66 Id. For more information regarding Justice Thomas’s argument and whether it is 
in line with the original meaning of the vagueness doctrine, see Part II.C. 
 67 US Const Amend V. 
 68 US Const Amend XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of the law.”). 
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that each branch of the federal government has limited powers 
that are not to be transgressed.69 This principle is not found in 
any one clause, but grows out of the clauses vesting distinct pow-
ers in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches.70 
Conceptually, locating the constitutional source of vagueness 
clarifies whom the doctrine aims to protect. For example, due pro-
cess concerns individuals being treated fairly, rather than an of-
fense against the public generally.71 Either the individual was not 
given fair notice of the conduct that was prohibited by the  
statute72 or the individual was arbitrarily targeted by law  
enforcement.73 
In contrast, the separation of powers prevents the legislature 
from failing to do its job and, in this sense, from committing an 
offense against the public at large. When Congress enacts a vague 
statute, law enforcement (executive branch) and judges (judicial 
branch) define what conduct is prohibited, essentially taking on 
the role of local and state legislatures.74 Although this is conven-
ient and salutary in some circumstances,75 “[c]ourts are the 
branch least competent to provide long-range solutions” for social 
 
 69 See Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the ‘Doctrine’ of Separation of Powers, 
85 Mich L Rev 592, 593 (1986). 
 70 See US Const Art I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers in Congress); US Const 
Art II, § 1, cl 1 (vesting all executive power in the president); US Const Art III (vesting all 
judicial power in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish”). 
 71 Decker, 80 Denver U L Rev at 246, 280–83 (cited in note 10). 
 72 See, for example, Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108 (1972); Cline v Frink 
Dairy Co, 274 US 445, 465 (“[I]t will not do to hold an average man to the peril of an 
indictment . . . [when] neither the person to decide in advance nor the jury to try him after 
the fact can safely and certainly judge the result [of his action].”); Connally v General 
Construction Co, 269 US 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute . . . so vague that men of common 
intelligence must guess at its meaning . . . violates the first essential of due process  
of law.”). 
 73 See, for example, Shuttlesworth v City of Birmingham, 382 US 87, 90 (1965) (“Lit-
erally read . . . the second part of [the ordinance in question] says that a person may stand 
on a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer of that city. The constitu-
tional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration.”). 
 74 See Grayned, 408 US at 108–09; Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Mean-
ings of “Judicial Activism”, 92 Cal L Rev 1441, 1472 (2004). 
 75 Judicial activism is salutary in circumstances when legislation cuts down or en-
croaches on political or civil rights. See United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 
152 n 4 (1938). For additional commentary on the value of judicial activism, see Clint 
Bolick, The Proper Role of “Judicial Activism”, 42 Harv J L & Pub Pol 1, 13–14 (2019); 
Rebecca Adelman and Amanda Haynes Young, Judicial Activism: Just Do It, 24 Memphis 
St U L Rev 267, 267–68 (1994). 
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problems.76 Because the Constitution vests Congress alone with 
the legislative power, vague statutes can consequently be an un-
constitutional delegation. 
What makes certain legislative delegations unconstitutional 
is that they circumvent the democratic process. Under the Con-
stitution, the adoption of new laws is supposed to be “the product 
of an open and public debate among a large and diverse number 
of elected representatives.”77 Federal judges, however, act “in the 
comparatively obscure confines of cases and controversies.”78 Al-
lowing legislators to delegate difficult policy choices to the judici-
ary effectively insulates those legislators from political backlash 
and prevents the general public from holding those who make de-
cisions accountable.79 
There is a difference between constitutional and unconstitu-
tional vagueness. Under the separation of powers, a vague statute 
may be constitutional so long as there are sufficient guidelines to 
cabin judicial and executive discretion. Since the Founding, 
courts have clarified the meaning of statutes over time as they 
applied their terms to specific cases.80 But when a law is “so de-
void of content that a court tasked with interpreting it ‘would 
simply be making up a law,’” vagueness becomes unconstitu-
tional.81 However, courts must still keep in mind that there is no 
 
 76 Kmiec, 92 Cal L Rev at 1472 (cited in note 74), quoting Columbus Board of Edu-
cation v Penick, 443 US 449, 488 (1979) (Powell dissenting). See also Jeffries, 71 Va L Rev 
at 190–97 (cited in note 44) (noting that courts are politically incompetent to define crime 
in particular); Jamin B. Raskin, Overruling Democracy: The Supreme Court vs. the Amer-
ican People 1–5 (Routledge 2003); Edward McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Di-
lemma of Judicial Policy-Making, 39 Minn L Rev 837, 843–46 (1955). 
 77 See Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1228. 
 78 Id, citing Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court 
at the Bar of Politics 151 (Bobbs-Merrill 1st ed 1962). 
 79 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495, 529–31, 537. 
 80 See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 
Mich L Rev 239, 309–10 (1989); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 
70 U Chi L Rev 519, 526 (2003). An example of the Court clarifying the meaning of a 
statute over time is the Sherman Antitrust Act. Early in the twentieth century, the con-
stitutionality of the Act was repeatedly challenged. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court 
narrowed the meaning of the Act so as to avoid invalidation. See Waters-Pierce Oil Co v 
Texas, 212 US 86, 96 (1909); Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States, 221 US 1, 30 
(1911); United States v American Tobacco Co, 221 US 106, 142 (1911). 
 81 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1249 (Thomas dissenting), quoting Lawson, 88 Va L Rev at 
339–40 (cited in note 64) (which provides as an example of a statute “devoid of content” a 
statute that requires “goodness and niceness”). 
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such thing as a perfectly clear statute.82 Because courts can con-
verge on a law’s meaning over time, it is important to allow a stat-
ute to percolate in the courts before deeming it unconstitutionally 
vague, despite the fact that this might produce unclear standards 
and give courts little guidance.83 
Practically, locating the constitutional source of the vague-
ness doctrine could alter when and to which laws the doctrine ap-
plies. First, locating the doctrine’s constitutional roots could 
change how the effect of a statute figures into the analysis. Due 
process targets the deprivation of life, liberty or property. Thus, a 
law that does not involve deprivation but is nonetheless arbitrar-
ily enforced could not be invalidated on due process grounds. In 
contrast, the separation of powers does not have any such textual 
limitation and therefore would potentially justify invalidation of 
a larger set of laws. 
Second, locating the constitutional source of the vagueness 
doctrine could determine whether classifying a statute as either 
federal or state is relevant. While due process restricts both fed-
eral and state governments, the separation of powers applies only 
to the federal government. As a result, a federal court cannot in-
validate a state law on separation-of-powers grounds. Conversely, 
a federal court can invalidate a state or local law on due process 
grounds.84 Thus, if the vagueness doctrine is rooted solely in the 
separation of powers, the fact that the separation of powers gen-
erally only limits federal action would decrease the scope of the 
vagueness doctrine. 
C. Early Conceptions of Vagueness: Vagueness Violates Both 
Due Process and Separation of Powers 
The following Section looks at how early American courts and 
scholars considered vagueness. The aim is not to provide an ex-
haustive account,85 but rather to observe and evaluate a way of 
 
 82 See Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 794 (1989) (“[P]erfect clarity and 
precise guidance have never been required.”); Grayned, 408 US at 110 (“[W]e can never 
expect mathematical certainty from our language.”). 
 83 For a discussion of the legal realist concept of “percolation,” see notes 176–79 and 
accompanying text. 
 84 For example, in Papachristou, the Court invalidated a local city ordinance on due 
process grounds. Papachristou, 405 US at 171. 
 85 This Section focuses on cases representative of their respective legal eras. These 
cases were cited in a debate between Justices Neil Gorsuch and Clarence Thomas regard-
ing whether the current interpretation of the vagueness doctrine is in line with the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution. See generally Dimaya, 138 S Ct 1204. See also Johnson, 
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thinking about vagueness that differs from the due process–fo-
cused modern test. The following analysis reveals that the early 
sources considered both due process and the separation of powers 
when evaluating vagueness. This Section, as well as the next, ar-
gues that the two constitutional protections are actually related 
and the role that each plays in the vagueness analysis should be 
clarified. The early cases illuminate how the practical and con-
ceptual differences between due process and the separation of 
powers discussed in Part I.B can help clarify the doctrine. The 
analysis also reveals that in early cases, the vagueness doctrine 
was used in an as-applied manner, rather than with the facial 
review that courts typically use today.  
The earliest reported vagueness case is The Enterprise,86 de-
cided in 1810.87 Although not explicitly stated, a close analysis of 
this case reveals both due process and separation-of-powers con-
siderations. The Circuit Court for the District of New York held 
that, while ignorance of the law is no excuse for its violation, “if 
this ignorance be the consequence of an ambiguous or obscure 
phraseology, some indulgence is due to it.”88 In other words, an 
individual cannot be accountable under a law unless it fairly de-
scribes the prohibited conduct (notice), which ensures due  
process. The court continued, “[N]o man should be stripped of a 
very valuable property . . . unless it be very clear that such high 
penalties have been annexed by law to the act which he has com-
mitted.”89 This phrase parallels the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment in that it describes prerequisites for depriving an individual 
of liberty or property.90 As such, it is fair to infer that the court 
considered due process as a reason to not apply the vague law to 
the defendant. 
In regard to the separation of powers, the court in The Enter-
prise stated that “[i]f no sense can be discovered for [the words of 
 
135 S Ct at 2563–75 (Thomas concurring in the judgment). Because this Comment does 
not attempt to define the original meaning of the vagueness doctrine, the details of that 
debate are beyond the scope of this Comment. This originalist question was virtually non-
existent prior to Dimaya’s antecedent case, Johnson. As a result, there is limited scholar-
ship discussing any of the cases cited in this Section. 
 86 8 F Cases 732 (CC D NY 1810).  
 87 See Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1225–26 (Gorsuch concurring in part and in the  
judgment). 
 88 The Enterprise, 8 F Cases at 734. 
 89 Id at 734–35. 
 90 US Const Amend V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”); US Const Amend XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
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a statute] . . . [a] court had better pass them by as unintelligible 
and useless, than to put on them, at great uncertainty, a very 
harsh signification, and one which the legislature may never have 
designed.”91 This language implicitly recognizes the judiciary’s 
role as interpreter rather than “creator” of the law. The phrase 
“had better” suggests the court is warning of the consequences 
involved in interpreting unintelligible statutes. The proceeding 
reference to what “the legislature may never have designed” im-
plies that this is the negative consequence. That is, the problem 
with interpreting vague laws is that the court imports meaning 
the legislature may not have intended. By suggesting that the ju-
diciary’s solution is to “pass them by as unintelligible and use-
less,” the court essentially assumes that unintelligible laws are 
not justiciable. Similar to judicial inaction when a plaintiff lacks 
standing or presents a political question, the quotation implies 
that courts should refrain from attempting to elucidate the vague 
provision and commenting on the merits of the case. Unlike its 
approach under the standing and political question doctrines, 
however, the court continued to apply sufficiently clear portions 
of the law, in effect ignoring the vague provision. In contrast to 
Papachristou and Dimaya, in which the Court invalidated the 
vague provisions for all future cases, the court in The Enterprise 
refused to apply the vague provision as it applies to this defend-
ant, keeping the law on the books for future cases. 
United States v Sharp92 is another early federal case that ref-
erenced both due process and separation of powers in refusing to 
apply the statutory phrase “endeavour[ ] to make a revolt.”93 Like 
in The Enterprise, the court appears to review the law as applied 
to this defendant and, therefore, does not strike down the law like 
the Supreme Court did with the facial review in Papachristou and 
Dimaya. Describing fair notice, the court explained that clear 
criminal laws ensure “all men, subject to their penalties, . . . know 
what acts it is their duty to avoid.”94 The court concluded that 
without a clear meaning of “revolt,” it could not submit the case 
to a jury, “however strong the evidence may be.”95 The court fur-
ther supported its conclusion by expressing separation-of-powers 
concerns: 
 
 91 The Enterprise, 8 F Cases at 735. 
 92 27 F Cases 1041 (CC D Pa 1815). 
 93 Id at 1042. 
 94 Id at 1043. 
 95 Id. 
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I cannot avoid feeling a natural repugnance, to selecting from 
this mass of definitions, one, which may fix a crime upon 
these men, and that too of a capital nature; when, by, making 
a different selection, it would be no crime at all, or certainly 
not the crime intended by the legislature.96 
 This quote highlights the “natural repugnance” to the concept 
of arbitrarily “fix[ing]” a crime upon individuals when there is not 
sufficient guidance from the legislature. If the crime was not “in-
tended by the legislature,” the judge essentially becomes the cre-
ator of the law, violating the separation of powers and leading to 
arbitrary adjudications. In addition to providing notice of “what 
acts it is [one’s] duty to avoid,” these excerpts show a multifaceted 
conception of vagueness that prevented courts from applying 
vague statutes on both due process and separation of powers 
grounds. The court does not specify whether due process and sep-
aration of powers are both necessary or sufficient for refusing to 
apply the statute to the defendant. Nevertheless, the court’s opin-
ion in Sharp shows that vagueness can be conceptualized both 
ways. Consequently, if one believes that both due process and  
separation-of-powers considerations are important constitutional 
protections in evaluating statutes’ clarity, the modern vagueness 
test should transparently reflect the role each plays in the analysis, 
rather than focusing mostly on due process concerns. This trans-
parency about constitutional foundations would clarify the scope 
of the doctrine, making it easier for courts to apply it predictably. 
The writings of early American scholars and their British in-
fluences also provide constitutional context for the vagueness doc-
trine. James Madison, for example, described how laws that are 
“so incoherent that they cannot be understood” effectively “poi-
son[ ] the blessing of liberty.”97 He indicated that in such in-
stances “[i]t [would] be of little avail to the people that the laws 
are made by men of their own choice.”98 Madison suggested that 
vague laws threaten democracy by separating the people from the 
lawmaking process, an issue previously discussed in Part I.B.99 
He further described the issue with vague laws in his Report on 
the Virginia Resolutions during the Alien and Sedition Act  
controversy: 
 
 96 Sharp, F Cases at 1043. 
 97 Federalist 62 (Madison), in The Federalist 415, 421 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed). 
 98 Id. 
 99 See notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
2320 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:2301 
 
If nothing more were required, in exercising a legislative 
trust, than a general conveyance of authority, without laying 
down any precise rules, by which the authority conveyed, 
should be carried into effect[,] it would follow[ ] that the 
whole power of legislation might be transferred by the legis-
lature from itself, and proclamations might become substi-
tutes for laws. A delegation of power in this latitude, would 
not be denied to be a union of the different powers.100 
Madison here describes both separation-of-powers and due pro-
cess concerns. A law that is “so incoherent that [it] cannot be un-
derstood” both provides inadequate notice to defendants—a due 
process violation—and is meaningless until law enforcement  
decides how to apply, and judges how to interpret, enigmatic  
separation-of-powers constraints.101 
William Blackstone, a scholar who heavily influenced the 
Framers, highlighted how British courts handled vagueness in 
his seminal treatise on British law.102 Blackstone described an 
eighteenth-century British court’s handling of a vague law that 
made “stealing sheep, or other cattle” a felony.103 Because the 
term “cattle” was expansive at the time and included wild ani-
mals, the court decided the statute failed to provide adequate no-
tice of what was included and, as a result, refused to apply the 
term “cattle.”104 The court’s actions subsequently led the legisla-
ture to modify the statute to explicitly include “bulls, cows, [and] 
oxen . . . by name.”105 Blackstone’s example implicates both due 
process and the separation of powers. The court explicitly refer-
enced due process through the idea of notice. Implicitly, the ex-
ample embodies the separation-of-powers principle: it shows the 
court did not have the capacity to alter the law and relied on the 
legislature to subsequently make the modification. Like the early 
American cases, this British court did not apply facial review and 
invalidate the statute, but rather looked to the facts of the case, 
performed as-applied review, and refused to apply the vague por-
tion (the term “cattle”) to the case before it. 
 
 100 James Madison, The Report of 1800, in David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, and 
Jeanne K. Cross, eds, 14 The Papers of James Madison 303, 324 (UVA 1991). 
 101 Federalist 62 (Madison), in The Federalist 415, 421 (cited in note 97). 
 102 See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 88 (Clarendon 
1769). See also Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1225 (Gorsuch concurring in part and in the  
judgment). 
 103 Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England at 88 (emphasis omitted). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
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The use of as-applied review by early British and American 
courts was not a strategic choice connected to the constitutional 
purpose of the doctrine. More likely, the use of the “case-by-case” 
approach106 is explained by the fact that courts had an entirely 
different conception of judicial review than courts do today.107 For 
this reason, there is no significant link between the dual concep-
tion of vagueness in the early courts’ analysis and the decision to 
use as-applied review.108 
Overall, the early cases and scholarship provide convincing 
support for a conception of the vagueness doctrine that is rooted 
in both due process and separation of powers. These cases high-
light the need for a vagueness doctrine that both ensures the leg-
islature delineates sufficient guidelines for applying the law (the 
separation of powers) and ensures individuals have fair notice of 
what the law requires (due process). Scholarship showing that 
due process originally grew out of the separation of powers fur-
ther supports this conception of vagueness. 
Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell, two 
prominent constitutional law scholars, suggest that the origin of 
both due process and separation of powers in the Anglo-American 
legal tradition is the Magna Carta.109 The Magna Carta provided 
that “[n]o free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, out-
lawed, banished, or in any way destroyed . . . except by the lawful 
judgment of his peers [or] by the law of the land.”110 By outlining 
procedures required before deprivation of liberty, the Magna 
Carta explicitly references due process. However, its separation-
of-powers concept is subtler. The idea is that the Crown must con-
vince an independent body of decision-makers that a defendant’s 
conduct violated either the common law or a statute enacted by 
 
 106 See Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1243 (Thomas dissenting). 
 107 See text accompanying notes 147–53. 
 108 Similarly, the prevailing use of facial review in modern courts does not appear to 
be linked to the constitutional purpose for the doctrine. In fact, the Supreme Court has 
been unable to set forth a consistent rationale for why facial review is proper in this con-
text. See Lockwood, 65 Syracuse L Rev at 433 (cited in note 33). In contrast, the proposed 
Structure and Rights Approach links the use of facial and as-applied review to the consti-
tutional purpose at each step of the test, which will help courts to clarify the scope of the 
doctrine and apply it consistently in future cases. See Part III. 
 109 The Magna Carta was an agreement between King John of England and a group 
of barons in 1215 to “restor[e] precious common law rights” to the people. See Mary Ziegler, 
The Conservative Magna Carta, 94 NC L Rev 1653, 1654–55 (2016). 
 110 Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 Yale L J 1672, 1682 (2012), quoting Magna Carta ch 29, reprinted and trans-
lated in A.E. Dick Howard, Magna Carta: Text and Commentary 43 (UVA 1964). 
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Parliament before restricting his or her liberty.111 Chapman and 
McConnell argue that it is through this institutional coordination 
restricting the Crown that the principle which evolved into the 
modern separation of powers entered English law.112 
In further support of due process and separation of powers’ 
interconnected nature within the vagueness context is the idea 
that the Bill of Rights serves as an additional protection for rights 
implicit in the Constitution. Some scholars suggest that the Bill 
of Rights was promulgated in response to fears that the new fed-
eral government might abuse some of its granted powers.113 De-
spite Alexander Hamilton’s suggestion that additional protection 
was unnecessary because Congress had not been given any 
rights-infringing powers, the Bill of Rights was nevertheless en-
acted to guard the protections that were not considered safe un-
der the Articles of the Constitution.114 In this way, due process can 
be thought of as an extension of and additional protection for the 
separation of powers. 
A close analysis of the Supreme Court’s modern arbitrary en-
forcement jurisprudence also reveals this close link between due 
process and the separation of powers. In Kolender v Lawson,115 a 
case invalidating a California loitering statute, the Court stated 
that “if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all 
possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say 
who could be rightfully detained . . . [it would] substitute the ju-
dicial for the legislative department.”116 This language implicitly 
suggests that the arbitrary enforcement prong of the modern, due 
process–focused vagueness test contains elements of the separa-
tion of powers, namely ensuring the legislature outlines sufficient 
guidelines for application.117 The arbitrary enforcement prong 
also has elements of due process, as it is concerned with the unfair 
 
 111 Chapman and McConnell, 121 Yale L J at 1683 (cited in note 110). 
 112 Id at 1682–84. 
 113 William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 Yale L J 
1738, 1793–94 (2013). 
 114 Id at 1754–55. See also Federalist 84 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 575, 579 (cited 
in note 97) (“For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? 
Why, for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall be restrained, when 
no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?”). 
 115 461 US 352 (1983). 
 116 Id at 358 n 7, quoting United States v Reese, 92 US 214, 221 (1876). 
 117 For clarification on the idea that the modern due process–focused test does not 
exclude elements of separation of powers, see id. 
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nature of arbitrarily targeting individuals.118 In this way, the ar-
bitrary enforcement prong may actually be a “hybrid” constitu-
tional protection, incorporating both due process and separation-
of-powers elements into the analysis.119 The modern due process 
test conflates these constitutional purposes, giving contradictory 
messages as to the doctrine’s scope.120 In order to provide con-
sistent guidance, the Court must delineate how each principle 
specifically influences the vagueness test. This recognition of the 
multifaceted and interconnected conception of vagueness serves 
as the foundation for the proposed vagueness framework in 
Part III. 
To summarize, the early cases and scholarship provide exam-
ples of how due process and the separation of powers can fit to-
gether in a vagueness analysis. Although these cases do not spec-
ify whether a violation of either is sufficient or if both are 
necessary, the courts clearly discuss the relevant considerations 
of fair notice and arbitrary enforcement, as well as judicial legis-
lation (that is, judges creating the law). Scholars who have stud-
ied the relationship between due process and separation of pow-
ers suggest the two are related, which helps one understand how 
these early courts articulated the two considerations. Rather than 
applying facial review that results in invalidating an unconstitu-
tionally vague law, these early courts evaluated the vague provi-
sions as applied to the defendants before them. In this sense, the 
provisions could be considered constitutional as applied to a dif-
ferent defendant. The next Section compares the early courts’ con-
sideration of vagueness to Papachristou to provide insight helpful 
for clarifying the current test. 
D. Reanalyzing Papachristou 
Reevaluation of Papachristou in light of the above analysis 
reveals two important differences between the current and early 
use of the vagueness doctrine. First, the constitutional protec-
tions justifying the vagueness doctrine differ. The early cases un-
derstood vagueness could violate both due process and the sepa-
ration of powers. The current doctrine, however, only mentions 
due process, although separation of powers elements seem to slip 
 
 118 See text following note 83. 
 119 For a more elaborate discussion of the “hybrid” nature of the arbitrary enforce-
ment prong, see Part I.D. 
 120 To understand how due process and the separation of powers affect the scope of 
the vagueness doctrine, see Part I.B. 
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into the analysis through the arbitrary enforcement prong.121 The 
Court may have adopted a due process approach because of the 
increased scope of this protection compared to the separation of 
powers. The separation-of-powers analysis applies to federal 
laws. Since Papachristou involved a city ordinance, the separa-
tion of powers would not justify striking down the ordinance. A 
court hoping to apply the doctrine across federal and state law 
would need to ground its use in due process. If both constitutional 
protections are in play, however, it is even easier to bring vague-
ness challenges because invalidation is possible regardless of the 
effect (deprivation) or type (federal versus state) of law. In this 
sense, a court hoping to broadly apply the vagueness doctrine 
should not limit itself to a due process or separation-of-powers 
analysis. 
Second, the conception of due process is different in early 
vagueness analyses. The early cases described only fair notice 
concerns whereas Papachristou also emphasized the role of arbi-
trary enforcement.122 Review for arbitrary enforcement allows the 
Court to evaluate statutes that are so flexible that law enforce-
ment or judges can apply them in an arbitrary fashion. Concep-
tually, the arbitrary enforcement prong has a separation-of- 
powers flavor. In theory, this prong signals when Congress has 
failed to provide adequate standards for application, therefore 
delegating its duty to the other branches. The Supreme Court, 
however, has never explicitly considered the separation of powers’ 
influence in this prong. Rather, the Court seems to jam these sep-
aration-of-powers considerations into the due process framework, 
conflating the two constitutional purposes. Because due process 
and the separation of powers differ in their scope and application, 
analyzing separation-of-powers considerations within the modern 
due process framework convolutes the doctrine and results in in-
consistent decisions. This result is exacerbated by the fact the 
Court has never articulated a test for identifying arbitrary en-
forcement. Together, these factors cause confusion over how 
courts should apply the prong. 
 
 121 See Papachristou, 405 US at 165; Morales, 527 US at 56. 
 122 Compare The Enterprise, 8 F Cases at 734–35, with Papachristou, 405 US at 170–
71; Morales, 527 US at 65 (O’Connor concurring) (“[T]he more important aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine ‘is . . . the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines 
to govern law enforcement.’”). 
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This analysis highlights how arbitrary enforcement is actu-
ally a “hybrid” problem that violates both due process and sepa-
ration of powers. On the one hand, arbitrary enforcement unfairly 
targets certain individuals, constituting a due process violation. 
On the other hand, arbitrary enforcement can result from a law 
with insufficient standards for guidance, which raises separation-
of-powers concerns. The current vagueness doctrine categorizes 
arbitrary enforcement as a due process violation. But this hybrid 
nature of arbitrary enforcement suggests that it should be  
reanalyzed to acknowledge its mixed constitutional purpose. Such 
a reconceptualization would allow courts to directly engage with 
the doctrine’s underlying purposes and thus identify a more pre-
dictable, coherent scope for its application.123 
The differences between early and modern applications of 
vagueness highlight how the Court has shifted the vagueness 
framework to apply in circumstances it deems appropriate. The 
Court may downplay the separation-of-powers elements of the 
test given the limitation this constitutional purpose has on the 
doctrine’s scope. In this way, the Court rhetorically depends on 
due process but incorporates conceptual elements of the separa-
tion of powers, leading to confusion regarding the doctrine’s ap-
plication and scope. Such manipulations have accompanied an in-
creasing necessity to protect individuals from discriminatory 
enforcement, both on a national and state level. They also explain 
why the vagueness test has developed the “I know it when I see 
it” quality that prevents consistent and principled application. In 
this way, the Court’s precedent has become incoherent for  
lower courts to follow, making it necessary to more clearly re- 
conceptualize the doctrine. Part III seeks to do just that. 
II.  DETERMINING WHEN AND HOW TO INVALIDATE A STATUTE: 
HOW VAGUE IS TOO VAGUE? 
After establishing that due process and separation of powers 
should allow courts to invalidate legislation,124 there is still a 
question of how vague a law must be in order to invalidate it and 
 
 123 As will be explained in Part III, the hybrid status of arbitrary enforcement war-
rants separate treatment from both due process and the separation of powers. Given the 
convoluted nature of the current doctrine, an explicit checklist of constitutional consider-
ations would help judges apply the doctrine more consistently. A separation could remind 
a judge of the doctrine’s hybrid nature, making her less likely to conflate the analysis of 
its individual parts. 
 124 See Parts I.A–C. 
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how to measure vagueness. I call this the “how vague is too vague” 
question. Inherent in the determination of how vague a law must 
be in order to invalidate it is the consideration of whether to apply 
facial or as-applied review. As previously mentioned, only facial 
review results in invalidation. Thus, in answering “how vague is 
too vague,” this Part evaluates whether facial or as-applied re-
view is appropriate. 
Part II.A describes modern approaches to evaluating “how 
vague is too vague.” Part II.B addresses the problems inherent in 
both approaches as they are currently conceived. Part II.C then 
looks to how early American cases determined how and when to 
invalidate a law. The early cases are not presented to offer a de-
piction of the correct vagueness analysis. Rather, they are used to 
compare and contrast the original method with the current one. 
By juxtaposing these methods, this Part identifies aspects of both 
approaches that actually aid the vagueness analysis and then in-
corporates these traits into the new framework proposed in 
Part III. 
A. The Modern Approaches 
In Johnson v United States,125 the case preceding Dimaya 
that invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) resid-
ual clause, Justices Thomas and Scalia disagreed on the question 
of how vague a law must be in order to invalidate it. Justice 
Thomas thought vagueness challenges were inappropriate “[i]f 
any fool would know that a particular category of conduct would 
be within the reach of the statute.”126 Justice Thomas explained 
that “if there is an unmistakable core that a reasonable person 
would know is forbidden by the law,” it is inappropriate to inval-
idate the law for all cases.127 This theory of the “unmistakable 
core” requires a law to be vague in all applications before a court 
invalidates it. According to Justice Thomas, a law is reviewed fa-
cially to determine whether a core exists. If there is no core, the 
law should be invalidated. If a core exists, however, Justice 
 
 125 135 S Ct 2551 (2015). 
 126 City of Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41, 112 (1999) (Thomas dissenting), quoting 
Kolender, 461 US at 370–71 (White dissenting). Morales was a predecessor vagueness case 
to Johnson in which Justice Thomas fully explained his “unmistakable core” conception of 
vagueness. In Johnson, Justice Thomas adopts the same reasoning without much added 
explanation. See Johnson, 125 S Ct at 2573 (Thomas concurring in the judgment). 
 127 Morales, 527 US at 112 (Thomas dissenting), quoting Kolender, 461 US at 370–71 
(White dissenting). 
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Thomas suggested judges evaluate on an as-applied basis 
whether a behavior falls within the core.128 In Dimaya, this would 
mean first determining whether the residual clause had an “un-
mistakable core” of behavior through facial review, then whether 
Dimaya’s offense of residential burglary fit within that core. Jus-
tice Thomas suggested that limiting this second step to as-applied 
review is in line with the rule of lenity, which dictates that penal 
statutes should be construed strictly in favor of the defendant.129 
If the defendant did not have fair notice, the law would not apply 
to him, but according to Justice Thomas, there is no need to in-
validate the provision for future cases. 
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, rejected the conception that 
a law is constitutional “merely because there is some conduct that 
clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.”130 Instead of an “unmis-
takable core,” Justice Scalia relied on fair notice and arbitrary 
enforcement to determine when a statute should be invalidated.131 
Refusing to define precise rules for when the doctrine applies, 
Justice Scalia’s approach is the predominant vagueness frame-
work, which suggests facial review and invalidation—rather than 
Justice Thomas’s as-applied approach—is always appropriate for 
vagueness analysis. 
B. Problems with the Modern Approaches 
A close analysis of these approaches reveals that both are 
flawed. Justice Thomas’s approach (invalidation only when a law 
lacks an “unmistakable core”) risks judges transforming the stat-
ute into something that was never intended by the legislature. 
Because Justice Thomas provides no guidance as to what consti-
tutes an “unmistakable core,” judges may develop conflicting 
methods for determining and applying the test. This flexibility al-
lows judges to cherry-pick aspects of the statute that they like, or 
think are clear, and those that they dislike, or think are vague. 
Because every judge may have a different interpretation of these 
issues, the same federal offense prosecuted before different judges 
may result in conflicting adjudications. 
Inconsistent adjudications are always possible when there is 
judicial discretion. However, the multitude of inconsistencies are 
 
 128 Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2567–68 (Thomas concurring in the judgment). 
 129 Id at 2567. 
 130 Id at 2561 (majority). 
 131 Id at 2557. 
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greater when a law has little to no interpretative guidance. A law 
may be vague and difficult to apply despite the presence of a 
“core” set of behaviors that obviously fall within it. For this rea-
son, Justice Thomas’s approach forces courts to rule on exact pa-
rameters of conduct once a “core” is established. This approach 
leads to a legal code in which everything is specified in extreme 
detail and many courts potentially disagree on those details. 
Given the current era of prolific litigation, the Supreme Court 
does not have the capacity to continually decide how the law ap-
plies to various permutations of facts.132 As a result, many of these 
conflicts will never be resolved. 
Conflicting decisions in the lower courts were precisely what 
led the Supreme Court to invalidate the ACCA’s residual clause 
in Johnson. For example, when evaluating whether conspiracy 
constituted a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause, 
some judges looked only at the dangers posed by the “simple act 
of agreeing [to commit a crime],” whereas other judges considered 
the probability that the “agreement [would] be carried out.”133 An-
other example of an ACCA circuit conflict involved statutory rape: 
some courts concentrated on the age difference between the per-
petrator and victim, while others did not.134 The Johnson Court 
highlighted that the most salient aspect of these splits was “not 
division about whether the residual clause cover[ed] this or that 
crime (even clear laws produce close cases); it [was], rather, per-
vasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one [was] 
supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one [was] supposed 
to consider.”135 
The “unmistakable core” approach to vagueness does not 
solve this problem. In both Johnson and Dimaya, Justice Thomas 
insinuated that the residual clause contained an “unmistakable 
core” but did not elaborate on what behavior was included within 
 
 132 See William H. Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious Problems Cur-
rently Experienced by the Federal Judicial System, 28 St Louis U L J 1, 2–6 (1984). Justice 
William Rehnquist argues that the decision-making capacity of the Supreme Court is too 
low to ensure uniformity and to superintend the lower courts. Id. He suggests the Court 
“simply is not able or willing, given the other constraints upon its time, to review all the 
decisions that result in a conflict in the applicability of federal law.” Id at 5. 
 133 Compare United States v Whitson, 597 F3d 1218, 1222 (11th Cir 2010), with 
United States v White, 571 F3d 365, 370–71 (4th Cir 2009). 
 134 Compare United States v Daye, 571 F3d 225, 230–32 (2d Cir 2009), with United 
States v McDonald, 592 F3d 808, 813–15 (7th Cir 2010). 
 135 Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2560. 
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that core or how a court should consider that question.136 Because 
Justice Thomas’s approach prevents invalidation if an “unmistak-
able core” exists, the Supreme Court would need to continually 
resolve discrepancies over what crimes were covered as well as 
what factors to consider when making that determination, which 
it arguably does not have the capacity to do. Justice Thomas 
seems to suggest that, in locating an “unmistakable core” and not 
invalidating the law, he is protecting the legislature’s will; ironi-
cally, courts may instead give inconsistent meaning to the law, 
likely missing the legislature’s purpose all together. Repeated in-
stances of arbitrary enforcement and conflicting adjudications vi-
olate the separation of powers.137 In these scenarios, judges are 
effectively creating, rather than interpreting, the law. 
Although Justice Scalia’s approach of invalidation regardless 
of an “unmistakable core” avoids the problem of judicial legisla-
tion, his framework nonetheless upsets the separation of powers 
by failing to give any effect to an act of Congress. If the statute is 
reviewed facially and invalidated in whole or in part on the first 
determination of vagueness, judges will not have the interpreta-
tive flexibility that leads to conflicting results. When a law is in-
validated, however, any intent Congress may have had is eviscer-
ated. The power to strike down statutes provides courts with 
“open-ended authority to oversee . . . legislative choices,”138 lead-
ing to a usurpation of “rules that were traditionally left to the 
democratic process.”139 In this way, both approaches upset the 
separation of powers. Justice Thomas’s approach upsets the sep-
aration of powers because when judges interpret a statute with-
out adequate guidance they are likely to misconstrue the will of 
Congress. Justice Scalia’s approach upsets the separation of pow-
ers by eviscerating the will of Congress all together. 
In this way, Justice Scalia’s approach conflicts with the in-
terpretative canon of avoidance, which urges courts to avoid con-
struing a statute in an unconstitutional manner.140 Invalidating a 
 
 136 See id at 2568, 2573 (Thomas concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the Gov-
ernment that “there will be straightforward cases under the residual clause”); Dimaya, 
138 S Ct at 1252 (Thomas dissenting). 
 137 See note 96 and accompanying text for an explanation of the manner by which 
repeated arbitrary enforcement leads to a violation of the separation of powers. 
 138 Kolender, 461 US at 374 (White dissenting). 
 139 Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1245 (Thomas dissenting). 
 140 See Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis 
concurring): 
2330 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:2301 
 
vague law that has an “unmistakable core” violates the avoidance 
canon because the Court could instead adopt an as-applied ap-
proach, refusing to apply the statute to the particular defendant 
but avoiding the law’s unconstitutionality. Although as-applied 
review can, in theory, lead to a separation-of-powers violation 
through conflicting adjudications, the Court’s role is to resolve 
such conflicts.141 Even if the Supreme Court may not have the ca-
pacity to resolve all of the conflicts that result from a vague law,142 
some would argue as-applied review is preferable because it 
avoids the separation-of-powers problem that judicial legislation 
creates. 
As Justice Scalia articulates, the benefit of the current ap-
proach is that invalidation can signal Congress to revise and clar-
ify the ambiguity. Blackstone described this effect when Parlia-
ment modified the cattle statute after courts refused to apply it.143 
Although Blackstone’s example involves as-applied rather than 
facial review,144 the British legislature was perhaps more attuned 
to the moves of the courts compared to current legislatures. The 
current proliferation of litigation makes it difficult for legisla-
tures to keep up with the multiplicity of court decisions refusing 
to extend a statute to a particular circumstance on an as-applied 
 
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a 
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this 
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible 
by which the question may be avoided. 
 141 The Supreme Court’s Rule 10 sets out the considerations governing review on cer-
tiorari. The rule expressly recognizes that certiorari may be granted where a circuit court 
or a state court of last resort “has entered a decision in conflict with” another court on  
“an important federal question.” See Sup Ct R 10(a)–(b). Further, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor has stated:  
[O]ne of the Supreme court’s most important functions—and perhaps the most 
important function—is to oversee the systemwide elaboration of federal law, 
with an eye toward creating and preserving uniformity of interpretation. . . . I 
breach no confidence in saying that the most commonly enunciated reason for 
granting review in a case is the need to resolve conflicts among other courts over 
the interpretation of federal law. 
Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Federalism, 35 Case W Res L Rev 1, 5 (1984). For additional 
information on the Court’s special emphasis on resolving conflicts among lower courts  
see Margaret Meriwether Cordray and Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:  
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 Wash U L Q 389,  
436–37 (2004). 
 142 See note 132 and accompanying text. 
 143 Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England at 88 (cited in note 102). 
 144 See notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
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basis. In contrast, facial review resulting in invalidation is a dra-
matic action that sends a clear message to the legislature. After 
the Supreme Court struck down the vagrancy statute in  
Papachristou, for example, many local governments amended 
their laws in an attempt to make them constitutional.145 Cities no 
longer prohibited simply wandering around but instead imposed 
additional elements, such as when an individual obstructs others 
from passing or when an individual constitutes a threat to public 
safety.146 In this light, invalidating a statute may be more “demo-
cratic” since invalidation may prompt congressional action and, 
as a result, elected officials will modify the law rather than ap-
pointed judges. 
C. Early Conceptions of Vagueness: As-Applied Review and 
Refusal to Apply 
Early courts applied the vagueness doctrine in a manner 
more similar to Justice Thomas’s conception. Justice Thomas be-
lieves that vagueness should be dealt with through the rule of 
lenity, which dictates that penal statutes should be construed 
strictly in favor of the defendant.147 He suggests that, rather than 
striking down laws as unconstitutionally vague, courts should 
“simply refuse[ ] to apply them in individual cases” according to 
this rule.148 
The early cases and scholarship, discussed in Part I.C, sup-
port Justice Thomas’s conclusion in a number of ways. First, 
Blackstone’s cattle statute appeared under a section entitled “pe-
nal statutes must be construed strictly.”149 This heading impli-
cates the rule of lenity as it states the rule’s meaning. Second, the 
early cases involved criminal statutes.150 Because the rule of len-
ity applies only to criminal cases, this may indicate that early 
courts applied the vagueness doctrine through the vehicle of the 
 
 145 See Peter W. Poulos, Chicago’s Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of Vagueness 
and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 Cal L Rev 379, 387–89 (1995); Joel D. Berg, Note, 
The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering Laws, 69 Chi Kent L Rev 461, 471–
72, 499–503 (1993). 
 146 See Poulos, 83 Cal L Rev at 387–89 (cited in note 145). Some of these laws have 
been invalidated as unconstitutional in a similar fashion as the law at issue in  
Papachristou. See, for example, Morales, 527 US at 41. Nevertheless, these legislatures 
continue to rewrite them to prevent unconstitutionality. See Andrew D. Leipold, Targeted 
Loitering Laws, 3 U Pa J Const L 474, 475–77 (2001). 
 147 See note 129 and accompanying text. 
 148 Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2568. 
 149 Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England at 88 (cited in note 102). 
 150 See Sharp, 27 F Cases at 1043; The Enterprise, 8 F Cases at 734. 
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rule of lenity. Third, the early cases show that, even when a judge 
refused to apply a vague law in one case, the law was not invali-
dated for future cases. For example, Justice Bushrod Washington, 
who in 1815 refused to “recommend to the jury, to find the pris-
oners guilty of making . . . a revolt” in Sharp,151 had no problem 
supplying a “judicial definition” of the phrase in a subsequent 
case in 1826, United States v Kelly.152 While this point does not go 
to the rule of lenity specifically, Justice Thomas used these cases 
to conclude that vagueness determinations were made only on an 
individual, as-applied basis in early America.153 
Although early courts performed as-applied rather than fa-
cial review, modern changes in the legal landscape might still jus-
tify facial review, and thus invalidation, in certain circumstances. 
For one, the concept of judicial review has transformed. Antebel-
lum courts understood judicial review as a “refusal to give a  
statute effect as operative law in resolving a case” (the result of 
as-applied review) rather than “strik[ing] down” legislation (the 
result of facial review).154 Courts grew to be more comfortable with 
facial review, including the invalidation of laws, and its use is 
widely accepted in modern times.155 This transformation of judi-
cial review suggests that the reason early courts did not invali-
date vague statutes had nothing to do with the vagueness doc-
trine. In this light, Justice Thomas’s qualms seem to be not with 
the doctrine itself, but with the modern conception of judicial re-
view.156 Nothing about the vagueness doctrine in particular war-
rants a departure from the practice of striking down unconstitu-
tional legislation, which is now accepted. 
The use of precedent is an additional change that partially 
accounts for the difference in how early courts addressed consti-
tutional violations. The current conception of precedent—that 
prior decisions not only provide authority for later decisions, but 
actually may bind subsequent courts—is of “relatively recent 
 
 151 Sharp, 27 F Cases at 1043. 
 152 24 US 417, 418 (1826). 
 153 Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2568 (Thomas concurring in the judgment). 
 154 See Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 NYU L Rev 738, 756 (2010). 
 155 See id at 755–57 (cited in note 154). See also National Federation of Independent 
Business v Sebelius, 567 US 519, 538 (2012) (“And there can be no question that it is the 
responsibility of the Court to enforce the limits on federal power by striking down acts of 
Congress that transgress those limits.”), citing Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 
1175–76 (1803). 
 156 See Morales, 527 US at 111 (Thomas dissenting) (criticizing the plurality’s use of 
the “disfavored mechanism of a facial challenge on vagueness grounds”). 
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origin.”157 This development may explain why Justice Washington 
refused to apply the statute criminalizing “endeavoring to make 
a revolt” in Sharp, but not in the subsequent case of Kelly. Be-
cause the legal landscape has changed, the as-applied approach 
urged by Justice Thomas may not be persuasive in all contexts. 
This is because as-applied review requires judges to continually 
analyze cases that perhaps will inevitably be deemed vague by 
the Supreme Court due to prior inconsistent determinations. Ra-
ther than require judges to perform this analysis repeatedly, fa-
cial review and invalidation of the law may be warranted. Fur-
ther, as explained in Part II.B, as-applied review gives courts 
more interpretive flexibility that can be abused to aid their own 
political preferences. If courts do not eventually converge on a 
law’s meaning, that flexibility becomes problematic. 
In sum, the modern vagueness doctrine is in disarray. The 
current framework fails to acknowledge a separation-of-powers 
component, thus confusing the role of arbitrary enforcement. 
Early cases and writings helpfully illustrate why the vagueness 
doctrine should remain rooted in both due process and separation 
of powers rather than mostly due process. However, these early 
sources provide little practical guidance on how to reformulate 
the modern doctrine because they depend on an outdated under-
standing of the judiciary and precedent. The following Part pro-
poses a solution: a new framework for the vagueness doctrine that 
clarifies the role of due process and the separation of powers and 
combines elements of both Justice Thomas’s and Justice Scalia’s 
approaches. Combining these elements will achieve a modern 
vagueness doctrine that both recognizes the importance of due 
process and the separation of powers and can actually function 
within the modern understanding of judicial power and prece-
dent. This new doctrine will also address the flaws present in the 
approaches of Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia by accounting 
for both the potential for judicial abuse and the need to accommo-






 157 See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding 
Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand L Rev 647, 659–81 (1999). 
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III.  THE STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS APPROACH: 
COMBINING SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DUE PROCESS INTO A 
THREE-PART TEST 
This Part proposes a new framework for evaluating vague 
laws: a three-step analysis called the “Structure and Rights Ap-
proach.”158 Step One asks whether the law violates the separation 
of powers, Step Two asks whether the law violates due process, 
and Step Three evaluates arbitrary enforcement (the “hybrid” due 
process and separation of powers protection). 
Although a law can be unconstitutional for violating any one 
of these steps, the proposed approach combines the analysis into 
a single test and requires judges to proceed sequentially. One rea-
son for the conjunctive quality of this framework is that ex ante 
determinations about whether a law implicates separation of 
powers, due process, or arbitrary enforcement can be difficult. 
This difficulty is evident from the current cases in which the 
Court describes separation of powers elements when conducting 
a due process analysis.159 Separating out the three considerations 
into distinct steps allows judges to move through a checklist. In 
this way, the proposed approach avoids eliding or confusing po-
tentially relevant analysis by sequentially proceeding from leni-
ent to stricter steps. The Structure and Rights Approach also ac-
counts for the conceptual overlap between the separation of 
powers and due process in the arbitrary enforcement step.160 Ar-
bitrary enforcement deserves its own step despite the fact that 
the two other steps encompass its component parts (due process 
and separation of powers) given the history of the Court misun-
derstanding the influence of this prong.161  
While reintroducing the role of separation of powers might 
make the Structure and Rights Approach seem stricter than the 
current test, the addition makes it no harder for a law to survive 
judicial scrutiny. Any law that fails the lenient separation-of- 
powers step inherently fails under the current test as well. The 
purpose of the proposed approach is not to make the test harder 
 
 158 The name Structure and Rights derives from the two constitutional purposes of 
the vagueness doctrine. “Structure” represents the separation-of-powers element while 
“Rights” represents the due process element. 
 159 See note 46. 
 160 For a discussion of the conceptual overlap between the separation of powers and 
due process, see Parts I.C–D. 
 161 For additional discussion of why arbitrary enforcement deserves its own prong, 
see Part III.C. 
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to overcome. Rather, the purpose is to make the judicial analysis 
more coherent and disciplined, accounting for the reality of judi-
cial abuse. In doing so, the approach attempts to prevent the “I 
know it when I see it” reasoning of the current approach and 
make the test more accessible to lower courts. 
In the following Sections, the proposed framework draws on 
originalist as well as legal-realist ideas. The originalism elements 
are extensions of the discussions in Parts I.C and II.C. The pro-
posed framework uses the originalist ideas about separation of 
powers and due process to embrace the symbolic importance of 
these constitutional protections. Understanding the origin and 
evolution of these protections helps inform the limits of the vague-
ness doctrine. 
The legal-realist analysis, on the other hand, derives primar-
ily from the revolutionary ideas of Justice Holmes. More specifi-
cally, many of the elements of the proposed framework are in-
spired by Justice Holmes’s famous line that “[t]he life of the law 
has not been logic: it has been experience.”162 Taking into account 
how prior decisions can help inform how future cases should be 
resolved, the proposed framework addresses vagueness from a 
practical perspective.163 
A. Step One: Evaluating Separation of Powers through an 
“Unmistakable Core” 
Step One, the separation of powers analysis, is adapted from 
Justice Thomas’s “unmistakable core” principle.164 Because the 
separation of powers constrains only federal law or laws created 
under a state constitution with a comparable provision, the first 
task is to determine whether this analysis is necessary. A court 
looking at the facts of Johnson or Dimaya would complete this 
first step by noting that the INA and ACCA are both federal stat-
utes and, therefore, the separation of powers is in play. If, how-
ever, the case involved a state law and that state constitution did 
not include a separation of powers protection, the court would 
move to Step Two without evaluating the separation of powers. 
 
 162 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law 1 (Little, Brown 1881). 
 163 For an example, see text accompanying notes 154–56 regarding the modern use of 
precedent. 
 164 See notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
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 If the court determines that this step is relevant, it then re-
views the law facially, asking whether it is vague in all applica-
tions. More specifically, the court determines if there is an “un-
mistakable core” of behavior that “any fool would know . . . [is] 
within the reach of the statute.”165 This approach supplements 
Justice Thomas’s concept of an “unmistakable core” by proposing 
judicial consensus as evidence that a law is not vague. If there is 
any behavior that courts agree “any fool would know” is within 
the statute, then an “unmistakable core” exists and the court 
should continue to Step Two. However, if there is no behavior that 
courts agree is within the statute, as measured by lack of judicial 
consensus, then no “unmistakable core” exists and the law should 
be invalidated.166 If a law violates the separation of powers at this 
stage, there is no need to proceed to the due process and arbitrary 
enforcement steps. 
This approach is adapted from the qualified-immunity con-
text. Qualified immunity prevents government actors from being 
held personally liable for constitutional violations unless the vio-
lation was of “clearly established law.”167 In cases involving qual-
ified immunity, a circuit split is considered a strong point in favor 
of the government official.168 As Professor William Baude notes, 
“When judges disagree, that might be a clue that the legal ques-
tion is hard and the materials are ambiguous.”169 Inconsistent ad-
judications can violate the separation of powers. If judges cannot 
agree on any application of a law, surely this is evidence that the 
law is unconstitutionally vague. 
The extreme nature of a separation-of-powers violation justi-
fies invalidation at the first step. When a law provides no guid-
ance as to what behavior might fall within its “unmistakable 
core,” law enforcement and courts must create its meaning to ap-
ply it. In this scenario, invalidation of the offending provision 
sends an indication to Congress that it must better specify the 
conduct prohibited, preventing judicial legislation. Because the 
 
 165 City of Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41, 112 (1999) (Thomas dissenting), quoting 
Kolender, 461 US at 370 (White dissenting). 
 166 See generally Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 
Georgetown L J 159 (2016) (offering a theory for how to consider decisions by other judges). 
But see generally William Baude and Ryan D. Doerfler, Arguing with Friends, 117 Mich 
L Rev 319 (2018) (arguing the consideration of other judges’ decisions should depend on 
shared methodology). 
 167 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Cal L Rev 45, 46 (2018). 
 168 Id at 75. 
 169 Id at 74. 
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Constitution allows for flexibility in interpreting the law, this 
step is purposefully weak to allow the law to develop.170 
According to the Structure and Rights Approach, the residual 
clause in Johnson has an “unmistakable core.” The ACCA lists 
“threatened use of physical force” as a trigger but also includes 
the residual clause, which incorporates behavior that “otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”171 The separation-of-powers question is 
whether there is a behavior “any fool would know” does not in-
volve the “threatened use of physical force” yet still presents a 
“serious potential risk of physical injury.” In Johnson, the Gov-
ernment listed a number of obviously dangerous crimes, such as 
providing material support for terrorism172 and producing chemi-
cal weapons.173 The Government explained that whether these 
crimes fell within the ACCA’s residual clause had not yet been 
the subject of reported appellate decisions.174 Under this Com-
ment’s proposed framework, these examples would constitute un-
disputed cases and establish an “unmistakable core.” 
Johnson highlights how low the bar is for this step. The  
analytical task of identifying a behavior that does not involve the 
“threatened use of physical force” yet still presents a “serious po-
tential risk of physical injury” is more difficult than the judicial 
consensus suggests. Even the example provided by the Govern-
ment, providing material support for terrorism, is suspect.175 Nev-
ertheless, the Structure and Rights Approach takes the fact of ju-
dicial consensus, or at least the lack of judicial disagreement, as 
evidence that the law is not vague at this stage without question-
ing the underlying rationale for the judges’ shared reasoning. 
While not questioning the rationale may make the analysis seem 
 
 170 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional 
Meaning, 119 Harv L Rev 1275, 1323 (2006) (noting that “many background norms are too 
vague to permit application until they have been further specified”). 
 171 18 USC § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 172 18 USC § 2339B(a)(1). 
 173 18 USC § 229(a). See Supplemental Brief for the United States, Johnson v United 
States, No 13-7120, *8–9, 44 (US filed March 20, 2015) (Supplemental Brief). 
 174 See Supplemental Brief, *8–9, 44 (cited in note 173). 
 175 Providing material support for terrorism arguably does not present a “serious po-
tential risk of physical injury.” The act of providing support is not in and of itself physically 
dangerous. Rather, the potential for injury is contingent on carrying out the act of terror-
ism. It is possible that, had the Supreme Court not invalidated the residual clause in 
Johnson, judicial consensus would have waned and the statute would come to violate the 
separation of powers according to the Structure and Rights Approach. In this way,  
the more evidence there is of a law’s ambiguity, the more likely it will eventually be  
invalidated. 
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incomplete, the goal is to provide courts with enough time to  
converge on a law’s meaning. The separation of powers is  
violated when conflicting adjudications suggest insufficient  
guidelines for application. Mere difficulty in discovering a law’s 
meaning should not alone be sufficient to invalidate a law or else 
all laws would be subject to invalidation. In addition, this ap-
proach encourages objectivity because the opinion of any one 
judge is not determinative. 
The concept of giving courts time to converge on a law’s mean-
ing is borrowed from the legal realist idea of percolation.176 Perco-
lation is defined as the “period of exploratory consideration and 
experimentation by lower courts before the Supreme [C]ourt ends 
the process with a nationally binding rule.”177 Professor Carolyn 
Shapiro, for example, describes how the Court typically allows 
several lower courts to consider a legal problem before granting 
certiorari.178 This “percolation” time gives the Court the benefit of 
considering the judgments of a number of jurists across a range 
of circumstances.179 Shapiro explains that this percolation time 
sometimes makes involvement by the Court unnecessary because 
the “appropriate level of uniformity” may arise without its  
interference.180 
 
 176 See Samuel Estreicher and John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 NYU L Rev 681, 716 (1984) (understand-
ing percolation as “the independent evaluation of a legal issue by different courts”). See 
also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The Fed-
eral Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L Rev 505, 524 (2013); Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the 
Olympian Court: Common Law Judging versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 
Wash & Lee L Rev 271, 331–32 (2006). 
 177 Estreicher and Sexton, 59 NYU L Rev at 716 (cited in note 176). 
 178 Shapiro, 63 Wash & Lee L Rev at 331–32 (cited in note 176). 
 179 Id. A number of Supreme Court justices have lauded the benefits of percolation. 
See McCray v New York, 461 US 961, 963 (1983) (Stevens respecting denial of cert) (“In 
my judgment it is a sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various States 
to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by 
this Court.”); Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1, 23 n 1 (1995) (Ginsburg dissenting) (“We have 
in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of 
‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a 
better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”). See also Michael 
C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv L Rev 4, 65–67 (1998) 
(defending the benefits of percolation). But see William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role 
of the Supreme Court, 14 Fla St U L Rev 1, 11 (1986) (discussing the drawbacks of perco-
lation); Todd J. Tiberi, Comment, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflict Cases: 
Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U Pitt L Rev 861, 882–92 (1993) (arguing that percola-
tion does not lead to better statutory decisions). 
 180 Shapiro, 63 Wash & Lee L Rev at 332 (cited in note 176). 
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In a similar way, the Structure and Rights Approach gives 
the lower courts time to converge on a law’s meaning. During a 
law’s infancy or as it is applied to new circumstances, lower courts 
may initially struggle to apply it consistently. If these inconsist-
encies persist, review by the Court is appropriate because incon-
sistent adjudications are indicative of insufficient guidelines for 
interpretation (a separation of powers violation). Over time, how-
ever, these inconsistencies may resolve themselves, making re-
view by the Court unnecessary. Inspired by legal realists like Pro-
fessor Shapiro and Justice Holmes, the Structure and Rights 
Approach accounts for this percolation period, giving a law time 
to find its meaning. 
Because of this step’s flexibility, it is difficult to identify any 
law that violates the separation of powers under this approach. 
That is, it is unlikely that all applications of a law will result in 
judicial disagreement. The Johnson Court explicitly rejected this 
“vague in all applications” approach because of its leniency to-
ward statutes.181 The proposed framework, however, balances the 
test by incorporating two additional steps (due process and arbi-
trary enforcement) that act as backstops for laws that may be un-
constitutionally vague but do not violate the separation of powers 
at the first step. 
While the leniency of this step may make it seem superfluous, 
its place in the Structure and Rights Approach is important to 
remind judges of the role that the separation of powers plays in 
the vagueness analysis. As seen in Papachristou and more recent 
cases, the Supreme Court has conflated the due process and sep-
aration of powers analysis, leading to difficulties in determining 
the doctrine’s scope. This step helps remind the judge of the pur-
pose for each prong which will, in turn, help create more con-
sistent analysis. 
B. Step Two: Evaluating Due Process through Fair Notice 
Step Two, the due process analysis, combines elements of 
Justice Thomas’s case-by-case approach and the current test’s no-
tice prong.182 Here, a court asks whether a reasonable person 
 
 181 See Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2560–61. 
 182 The Supreme Court focuses on whether a statute (1) fails to “give a person of ordi-
nary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,” 
(the fair notice prong) and (2) encourages “arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions” 
(the arbitrary enforcement prong). Papachristou, 405 US at 162, citing Herndon v Lowry, 
301 US 242, 257 (1937). See notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
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would have notice that the defendant’s conduct fell within the 
statute. Rather than looking abstractly at the statute as the cur-
rent vagueness test does, the Structure and Rights Approach con-
siders the facts of the case. In Dimaya, for example, a court would 
ask whether a reasonable person would know residential bur-
glary fell within the residual clause’s understanding of “violent 
felony.” If the answer is no, a judge should refuse to apply the 
statute to the given conduct but should not invalidate the statute. 
Since the law is not invalidated, even if a due process violation oc-
curs, a judge should continue to the arbitrary enforcement analysis 
in Step Three to determine whether repeated application of the law 
in a number of cases suggests invalidation is appropriate. 
The as-applied nature of this step involves looking to the facts 
of the case and draws inspiration from Justice Thomas’s approach 
as well as early courts’ narrow consideration of vagueness chal-
lenges. This method of review is preferable to the facial review 
approach taken by the Papachristou and Dimaya Courts consid-
ering that due process focuses on individual fairness.183 Just be-
cause a reasonable person does not consider one behavior to fall 
within a statute, it does not mean that she would feel the same 
about a different behavior. A court’s role is to interpret the statute 
and differentiate between these cases. The current approach pre-
vents the court from fulfilling this duty by allowing invalidation 
of a statute regardless of an “unmistakable core.” While as- 
applied review leaves more room for judges to abuse their inter-
pretive powers by cherry-picking, the Structure and Rights Ap-
proach provides protection against such abuse through the second 
backstop, arbitrary enforcement (Step Three). In this way, the 
proposed framework cures the “fundamental flaw” described by 
Justice Thomas and explained in Part II.B.184  
The Structure and Rights Approach deviates from Justice 
Thomas’s approach by differentiating between fair notice and the 
“unmistakable core.” After identifying an “unmistakable core,” 
Justice Thomas asked whether the defendant’s conduct fit within 
that core. In contrast, the Structure and Rights Approach asks 
whether the defendant had fair notice that the conduct fell within 
 
 183 Decker, 80 Denver U L Rev at 280–83 (cited in note 10). See note 29 and accompa-
nying text for a description of the modern preference for facial review in the vagueness 
context despite a lack of consistency from the Supreme Court. 
 184 The “fundamental flaw” being that when judges are forced to interpret a law that 
does not provide sufficient guidance, they are essentially “making up the law” themselves, 
therefore frustrating the separation of powers. See notes 63–64 and 80–83 and accompa-
nying text. 
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the statute. Justice Thomas might respond that the two ap-
proaches essentially ask the same question because any conduct 
that fails fair notice would fall outside the “unmistakable core.” 
The fair notice inquiry, however, is substantively different: there 
are circumstances in which a behavior may fall outside the “un-
mistakable core” because “any fool” may not know that the con-
duct fell within the statute, yet the statute does not violate fair 
notice because a “reasonable person” would know that the conduct 
fell within the statute. Would a reasonable person not understand 
the residual clause encompassed more than just the extreme of 
providing material support for terrorism? The Structure and 
Rights Approach clarifies the vagueness inquiry by separating 
the two questions. Step One addresses “any fool” and Step Two 
addresses a “reasonable person.” Although reasonable people 
might disagree on what conduct falls outside the “unmistakable 
core” while still knowing that the “unmistakable core” does not 
include all behaviors, the court’s job is to interpret the law to de-
termine what a reasonable person should know.185 
The crux of the second step’s due process analysis is deter-
mining what a reasonable person should know the statute covers. 
Naturally, this is a difficult inquiry. Reasonable person standards 
are inherently messy and often result in judicial disagreement. 
Fortunately, judges have guidance from the uncountable reason-
able person standards used in the tort, contract, and criminal  
contexts.186 
Unlike Step One, in which judicial disagreement signals a vi-
olation of the separation of powers, such disagreement is less con-
cerning for the due process analysis in Step Two. Due process con-
cerns how an individual was treated, not whether the legislature 
provided sufficient guidelines. It is for this reason that the Court 
has suggested in the criminal context that the “existence of con-
flicting cases” makes a ruling against the defendant “reasonably 
foreseeable.”187 Because the law allows for flexibility in interpre-
tation, courts should not be concerned with every disagreement 
that might arise in applying Step Two. Instead, the Structure and 
Rights Approach provides guidelines for invalidation when judges 
 
 185 See United States v International Minerals & Chemical Corp, 402 US 558, 562 
(1971) (noting the maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse”). 
 186 See Kevin P. Tobia, How People Judge What is Reasonable, 70 Ala L Rev 293, 298 
(2018). For a discussion of how the reasonableness standard applies in the constitutional 
setting, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 Minn L Rev 
61 (2017). 
 187 See United States v Rodgers, 466 US 475, 484 (1984). 
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fail to agree on any behavior (Step One) or when the multiplicity 
of disagreements indicates subpar guidelines for application 
(Step Three). 
Under this more nuanced understanding of notice, due pro-
cess will always be violated when the separation of powers is vio-
lated. If a statute is vague in all applications, it must also be 
vague as applied to the particular conduct in question. This ex-
plains why the proposed framework is no stricter than the current 
test. The interplay makes sense if due process arises out of the 
separation of powers. 
C. Step Three: Evaluating the “Hybrid” Role of Arbitrary 
Enforcement 
Step Three is adapted from the arbitrary enforcement prong 
of the current vagueness test, readjusting that prong to reflect its 
“hybrid” nature.188 Arbitrary enforcement is hybrid because of the 
confluence of due process and separation of powers considerations 
implicated in its analysis. This stage is distinct from Steps One 
and Two because the court is to consider both whether the legis-
lature provided sufficient guidelines for enforcement and inter-
pretation (separation of powers) and whether the defendant was 
treated unfairly (due process), rather than isolating each consid-
eration. Although the separation of powers is reserved for federal 
laws, this step is performed on all laws because due process, 
which restricts both states and the federal government, is a con-
sideration in Step Three. 
Arbitrary enforcement warrants separate treatment from 
both due process and the separation of powers because of its hy-
brid nature. As mentioned, due to the convoluted nature of the 
current doctrine, an explicit checklist of constitutional considera-
tions will help judges more consistently apply the doctrine. If the 
arbitrary enforcement prong remains in the due process analysis, 
the separation-of-powers elements of arbitrary enforcement may 
not be adequately recognized. Likewise, if analyzed entirely 
within the separation-of-powers prong, the significance of the due 
process elements may be undermined. Separating out each pur-
pose for the doctrine (due process, separation of powers, and the 
hybrid arbitrary enforcement) allows judges to move through the 
checklist and better ensure no element is conflated or forgotten. 
 
 188 See notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
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At this stage, a court should determine whether prior appli-
cation of the law evidences arbitrary enforcement and whether 
this history suggests insufficient guidelines for application. Un-
der the Structure and Rights Approach, the defendant has the in-
itial burden in making a prima facie showing of arbitrary enforce-
ment. To do so, the defendant must provide evidence of judicial 
disagreement on how to apply the statute. Unlike Step One, 
which requires judicial disagreement on all applications, any 
form of judicial disagreement will suffice at this stage. A defend-
ant can also fulfill the prima facie showing by providing evidence 
of arbitrary law enforcement actions, such as statistics that one 
population of people is burdened more heavily than another. This 
alternative route is important because a law can be enforced ar-
bitrarily even without conflicting adjudications—for example, by 
being enforced against “vaguely undesirable [people] in the eyes 
of the police and prosecution” rather than all offending citizens.189 
Putting the burden on the party challenging a law is typical 
in the constitutional setting. The Structure and Rights Approach 
eases this burden by requiring only a prima facie showing in order 
to shift the burden to the government. This more lenient standard 
is necessary given the difficulty a given defendant will have find-
ing evidence of arbitrary enforcement. Because the government is 
likely in a better position to find this information, the Structure 
and Rights Approach lightens the requirement. 
Upon a preliminary showing of arbitrary enforcement, the 
burden of proof shifts to the government to explain why the law 
can be applied in a nonarbitrary fashion despite evidence to the 
contrary. The vaguer a law is, the more conflicting adjudications 
and inappropriate law enforcement action the government will 
need to refute. In this way, the burden-shifting framework acts 
as a sliding scale. If the government does not satisfy its burden of 
explaining why the law is not arbitrary, the court should invali-
date the statute. The Structure and Rights Approach adopts this 
burden-shifting framework for a similar reason it institutes a 
prima facie showing requirement. That is, the government is in a 
better position to defend inconsistent adjudications given its ac-
cess to statistical information than a defendant is to challenge it. 
The ACCA’s residual clause, which was evaluated in  
Johnson, provides an example of when the Structure and Rights 
Approach would invalidate a law at Step Three. Although the 
 
 189 Papachristou, 405 US at 166. 
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clause contained an “unmistakable core” (Step One)190 and pro-
vided fair notice that defendant’s behavior fell within the law 
(Step Two),191 the conflicting methods of determining how conspir-
acy and statutory rape fit within the clause revealed a lack of ap-
propriate guidelines (Step Three). As the Johnson Court acknowl-
edged, “the failure of ‘persistent efforts . . . to establish a 
standard’” provides evidence of vagueness.192 Invalidating the law 
at this stage protects against judicial legislation and sends a sig-
nal to Congress to improve guidelines for application. The ap-
proach also accommodates the avoidance doctrine by asking 
courts to interpret the limits of an “unmistakable core” when pos-
sible, thus attempting to give effect to the meaning of the  
legislature.193 
The ways in which the proposed role of arbitrary enforcement 
differs from the modern test’s arbitrary enforcement prong cures 
the “fundamental flaw” of judicial legislation.194 The current test 
reviews the law facially, looking at the statute’s text to determine 
whether sufficient guidelines for enforcement exist. Basing the 
analysis solely on the potential for arbitrary enforcement allows 
for invalidation of almost any law because discretion is an im-
portant aspect of enforcement.195 This abstract quality in the cur-
rent vagueness test’s arbitrary enforcement prong grants the ju-
diciary broad power and creates uncertainty.196 
In contrast to the unpredictability of the current approach, 
the Structure and Rights Approach creates more consistency by 
requiring parties to show evidence of arbitrary enforcement. The 
law is still reviewed facially in the sense that the court is not lim-
ited to the facts of the case and may look at enforcement in all 
contexts. Nevertheless, the requirement of evidence avoids the “I 
know it when I see it” quality of the current test by providing 
 
 190 See Part III.A. 
 191 Although the fair notice discussion in Dimaya revolved around the burglary ex-
ample used in the INA’s residual clause, the Supreme Court deemed the language in the 
INA and ACCA residual clauses sufficiently similar. See Dimaya, 138 S Ct at 1218–21. 
Thus, behaviors that fell within the INA’s residual clause would also fall within the 
ACCA’s. 
 192 Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2558, quoting United States v L. Cohen Grocery Co, 255 US 
81, 91 (1921). 
 193 See note 140 and accompanying text. 
 194 See Part II.B (describing the fundamental flaws of judicial abuse and evisceration 
of the will of the legislature). 
 195 See Lockwood, 8 Cardozo Pub L Pol & Ethics J at 297–98 (cited in note 33). 
 196 See id at 298.  
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judges with real, rather than hypothetical, circumstances to con-
sider. For example, in Papachristou, rather than hypothesize 
about the potential for the vagrancy ordinance to result in arbi-
trary enforcement, the Structure and Rights Approach requires 
some preliminary evidence that the law is actually being enforced 
against members of golf clubs as well as patrons of pool halls. 
Although requiring the defendant to produce evidence of ar-
bitrary enforcement may not seem to help defendants, this ap-
proach actually favors them. The defendant-friendly aspect re-
sults from the burden-shifting framework. After the defendant 
has provided any evidence of arbitrary enforcement, the govern-
ment must explain why the law is not actually being enforced ar-
bitrarily or how they will correct such arbitrary enforcement mov-
ing forward. For example, the government might provide evidence 
that while the Papachristou ordinance was previously enforced 
only against frequenters of pool halls, there have been changes in 
enforcement practices that show the law is now being enforced 
against all populations of violators. Alternatively, the govern-
ment might propose an enforcement policy that will prevent such 
arbitrary enforcement in the future, such as patrolling practices 
that target both locations similarly and document such interac-
tions. This will provide data to better inform a court’s decision in 
a future case. The government will explain that, while the law 
has the potential for arbitrary enforcement, the reality is that it 
currently is not enforced in a problematic way, or will not be in 
the future. In many cases, the government will have a hard time 
overcoming this burden. The better the evidence of arbitrary en-
forcement, the more difficult it will be for the government to prove 
its burden, facilitating invalidation of the laws shown to be most 
problematic. In this way, the proposed approach does not disad-
vantage defendants; rather, it helps them by placing the burden 
on the government, the party most likely to have enforcement  
statistics. 
The goal of the proposed approach is to give a law time to find 
its meaning before invalidating it for vagueness. After a law is 
enacted, it will be applied by law enforcement officers who arrest 
individuals suspected of violating the law and by courts determin-
ing whether the law was actually violated by the suspect. Re-
peated application of the law may reveal that law enforcement 
officers apply the law arbitrarily or that courts do not agree on 
the law’s meaning, resulting in conflicting adjudications. These 
conflicting adjudications or arbitrary law enforcement targeting 
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can be indications of subpar standards for guidance. Neverthe-
less, the problem may fix itself over time: higher courts may issue 
guidance on how to narrowly read a law, the Supreme Court may 
resolve conflicting adjudications, or law enforcement may insti-
tute practices that lead to more principled enforcement. 
If the constitutionality of a law is challenged on vagueness 
grounds, the proposed approach encourages courts not to invali-
date a law unless there are signs that the law cannot, or will not, 
be applied in a principled fashion in the future. As mentioned, it 
is the government’s burden to explain why courts will converge 
on a law’s meaning or why the police will stop enforcing the law 
arbitrarily. If not convinced of this probability, courts are then 
justified in invalidating the law under the Structure and Rights 
Approach. Requiring evidence of the arbitrary enforcement or 
conflicting adjudications restrains judges from invalidating laws 
whose meaning may solidify or whose enforcement will straighten 
out over time. 
Courts should be wary of invalidating statutes when the dif-
ficulty in applying a law results not from the language of the stat-
ute but from the Court’s interpretation. Johnson is an example of 
the Court interpreting the ACCA in a way that results in invali-
dation. In Johnson, the Government could have explained that 
the difficulty with the residual clause was not the statute itself 
but the Court’s adoption of the categorical approach.197 Through 
the canon of avoidance, a court then evaluates whether an alter-
native interpretation would save the statute. As Justice Samuel 
Alito suggested in dissent, the Court could have eliminated the 
categorical approach, deciding instead whether the facts of John-
son’s case constituted a “violent felony.”198 The Supreme Court, 
however, decided that an alternative interpretation that saved 
the statute from being unconstitutionally vague was not plausible 
based on the statutory text: “Congress intended the sentencing 
court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been con-
victed of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the 
facts underlying the prior convictions.”199 Thus, Justice Alito’s so-
lution would violate the will of the legislature and result in im-
permissible judicial legislation. The Court concluded the only al-
ternative was to invalidate the residual clause. 
 
 197 As mentioned in Part I.A, the categorical approach requires courts consider the 
“ordinary case” of a particular crime, rather than looking to the actual facts of a case. 
 198 See Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2578–80 (Alito dissenting). 
 199 Id at 2562, quoting Taylor, 495 US at 600. 
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* * * 
To summarize, the Structure and Rights Approach includes 
three steps. Step One evaluates the separation of powers and re-
views a law facially to determine whether an “unmistakable core” 
of the law exists. More specifically, a court asks whether there is 
a behavior that “any fool would know” is included within a stat-
ute, looking to judicial consensus as an indicator. Step Two eval-
uates due process in the form of fair notice. This step uses as-
applied review and looks to whether the particular defendant in 
the case had fair notice that his behavior fell within the statute. 
Step Three evaluates arbitrary enforcement, the hybrid due pro-
cess and separation of powers protection. Here, the court reviews 
a law facially and asks the party challenging the law to provide 
evidence that the law has been applied arbitrarily in any context. 
The challenger can provide such evidence in the form of incon-
sistent adjudications or arbitrary law enforcement action. Upon a 
preliminary showing of arbitrary enforcement, the burden 
switches to the Government to explain why the law can be applied 
consistently despite evidence to the contrary. The next Section 
applies this approach to a recent decision. 
D. Applying the Structure and Rights Approach: Analyzing 
Guerrero v Whitaker 
This Section analyzes a recent Ninth Circuit vagueness deci-
sion, highlighting the difficulty in applying the current test and 
how the proposed framework facilitates the inquiry. The INA pro-
vides that refugees are not protected from deportation if they 
have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime” which  
renders them a danger to the community.200 In Guerrero v  
Whitaker,201 a Ninth Circuit panel rejected the argument that the 
phrase “particularly serious crime,” was unconstitutionally 
vague.202 The case involved a native of Mexico who had been con-
victed of possessing heroin. The question was whether that con-
viction qualified as “particularly serious.”203 Because the current 
 
 200 8 USC § 1231(b)(3)(B). 
 201 908 F3d 541 (9th Cir 2018). 
 202 Id at 545. 
 203 Guerrero v Whitaker, 742 Fed Appx 293, 293 (9th Cir 2018). 
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test evaluates vagueness in a facial, rather than as-applied, man-
ner, the Ninth Circuit wrote separate opinions for the vagueness 
and merits determinations.204 
In its vagueness opinion, the panel suggested that the resid-
ual clauses in Johnson and Dimaya were problematic not because 
the terms were “uncertain in isolation” but because “the uncer-
tainty had to be applied to an idealized crime.”205 The panel con-
cluded that, while “[m]any statutes provide uncertain standards, 
. . . so long as those standards are applied to real-world facts, the 
statutes are almost certainly constitutional.”206 In contrast to the 
residual clause, the “particularly serious crime” provision in 
Guerrero applied to “real-world facts” and, therefore, was not un-
constitutionally vague. In coming to this conclusion, the panel 
recognized it was overruling its prior precedent, Alphonsus v 
Holder,207 which had adopted the “unmistakable core” principle as 
its approach to vagueness.208 The panel reasoned that such an ap-
proach was “clearly irreconcilable” with Johnson’s rejection of the 
notion that “a vague provision [could be] constitutional merely be-
cause . . . some conduct . . . clearly falls within [its] grasp.”209 
The Ninth Circuit’s Guerrero decision illustrates the diffi-
culty of applying the current vagueness test for a number of rea-
sons. First, the court claimed Johnson overruled Alphonsus and 
its “unmistakable core” reasoning. As mentioned in Part I.A and 
Part II, Johnson was the predecessor case to Dimaya that ruled 
the ACCA’s residual clause and the use of the categorical ap-
proach was unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the Court held 
that, because of the combination of uncertainty as to how to meas-
ure risk and how much risk it takes to qualify as a violent felony, 
“the residual clause produce[d] more unpredictability and arbi-
trariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.”210 In Johnson, 
Justice Thomas urged the Court to adopt the “unmistakable core” 
approach to vagueness and avoid holding the clause unconstitu-
tional.211 However, the Johnson Court emphasized that its prece-
dents, which long predated Alphonsus, prevented the adoption of 
 
 204 See id; Guerrero, 908 F3d at 542. 
 205 Guerrero, 908 F3d at 545. 
 206 Id. 
 207 705 F3d 1031 (9th Cir 2013). 
 208 Id at 1041–43. 
 209 Guerrero, 908 F3d at 544, quoting Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2561. 
 210 Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2558. 
 211 Id at 2573 (Thomas concurring in the judgment). 
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the “unmistakable core” approach in the first place.212 The fact 
that the Ninth Circuit’s existing “unmistakable core” approach 
violated Supreme Court precedent without the Ninth Circuit 
knowing shows how convoluted the Court’s precedent is. 
Second, after rejecting the “unmistakable core” approach in 
Guerrero, the Ninth Circuit seemingly violated Supreme Court 
precedent. The suggestion that “so long as [ ] standards are ap-
plied to real-world facts, the statutes are almost certainly consti-
tutional”213 squarely contradicts cases such as Papachristou. De-
termining whether a defendant “frequent[ed] . . . places where 
alcoholic beverages [were] sold” does not involve an abstract de-
termination.214 Nevertheless, the Papachristou Court deemed the 
vagrancy ordinance unconstitutionally vague.215 The fact that the 
current vagueness test allowed the Ninth Circuit to overlook this 
line of precedent is troublesome. 
Third, while the Ninth Circuit referenced the Court’s current 
two-pronged vagueness test, it did not explain how that test ap-
plies to the “particularly serious crime” provision of the INA. Ra-
ther, the court spent the majority of its analysis comparing the 
provision’s uncertainty to the uncertainty in the residual clause. 
This approach mirrors what the Supreme Court typically does. 
The Court rarely explains how to apply the vagueness test. In-
stead, the Court cites the test’s two prongs and then its conclusion 
without documenting how the two connect.216 Guerrero illustrates 
that without additional guidance, lower courts are not sure how 
to apply the test and tend to rely on aspects of Supreme Court 
precedent that conflict with other decisions, as was the case in 
Guerrero. 
Applying the Structure and Rights Approach to Guerrero aids 
the vagueness analysis by providing steps with analytical guid-
ance for a court to move through. First, the “particularly serious 
crime” provision is a federal law that the court should evaluate at 
Step One. The provision has an “unmistakable core” and, there-
fore, does not violate the separation of powers at this preliminary 
stage. The statute itself lists aggravated felonies as a group of per 
 
 212 See id at 2560–61 (majority), citing United States v L. Cohen Grocery Co, 255 US 
81, 89 (1921) (striking down a law prohibiting grocers from charging an “unjust or unrea-
sonable rate . . . —even though charging someone a thousand dollars for a pound of sugar 
would surely be unjust and unreasonable”). 
 213 Guerrero, 908 F3d at 545. 
 214 Papachristou, 405 US at 164. 
 215 Id at 171. 
 216 See generally Johnson 135 S Ct 2551; Dimaya, 138 S Ct 1204. 
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se “particularly serious crimes.”217 The fact that there is judicial 
consensus as to whether first-degree murder, for example, quali-
fies as an aggravated felony for the purposes of the “particularly 
serious crime” provision is sufficient to pass this step. Note that 
at this stage, the court should not be concerned with evaluating 
the defendant’s particular behavior (heroin possession), but with 
determining whether any behavior fits within the “unmistakable 
core.” 
Because there is an “unmistakable core,” the court should 
continue to Step Two, evaluating due process concerns through 
fair notice. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has previ-
ously announced that drug trafficking offenses, including heroin 
possession, are per se “particularly serious crimes.”218 Because ac-
tual notice is not required and the BIA’s per se determination 
makes clear that a reasonable person would know heroin posses-
sion was a “particularly serious crime,” Guerrero had fair notice 
and his due process rights were not violated. Notice how this step 
looks to the actual facts of the case rather than evaluating the 
statute abstractly. 
Because Guerrero had fair notice, the court should proceed to 
the third and final step of the Structure and Rights Approach, 
evaluating arbitrary enforcement—the hybrid separation of pow-
ers and due process protection. Here, the party challenging the 
law would present evidence of arbitrary enforcement, either by 
conflicting adjudications or law enforcement targeting a particu-
lar population. Either of these routes is sufficient; a challenger 
need not show evidence of both but is free to do so should it ex-
ist.219 Upon the presentation of any evidence, the burden switches 
 
 217 8 USC § 1231(b)(2)(B)(iv). The fact that the legislature can delineate per se crimes 
that constitute the “unmistakable core” shows how lenient the separation-of-powers step 
is. In theory, the legislature could enact a law saying it is illegal to do “bad stuff” and 
specify that murder was included in the definition of “bad stuff.” Murder would constitute 
the “unmistakable core” of the “bad stuff” statute, preventing invalidation at Step One of 
the Structure and Rights Approach. Although it appears the “bad stuff” statute may give 
law enforcement “unfettered discretion” as in Papachristou, the courts may narrow the 
meaning of the “bad stuff” statute over time, preserving its constitutionality. This is es-
sentially what happened with the Sherman Antitrust Act. See note 80. Additionally, Steps 
Two and Three protect due process and separation-of-powers principles by ensuring that 
the “bad stuff” statute would not pass constitutional muster if applied in an unconstitu-
tional manner. For further discussion of the leniency of this step and why it is not prob-
lematic, see text accompanying note 181. A special thanks to my classmate Joseph Begun 
for proposing the concept of a “bad stuff” statute. 
 218 See In re Y-L-, 23 I & N Dec 270, 276 (AG 2002). 
 219 See note 189 and accompanying text. 
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to the party supporting the law to explain why the law is not ar-
bitrary and can be applied in a principled manner. At this stage, 
the parties are not bound by the facts of the case but should con-
sider whether previous application of the law in any context evi-
dences subpar interpretative standards. 
In the case of the INA’s “particularly serious crime” provision, 
the defendant would describe the current circuit split (conflicting 
adjudications) to meet the threshold showing. The Third Circuit 
has held that the language of 8 USC § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) makes 
clear that a crime cannot be “particularly serious” unless it is an 
aggravated felony.220 The BIA and the majority of the circuits, 
however, have held that the language of the statute allows the 
attorney general to designate crimes as particularly serious re-
gardless of their classification as aggravated felonies.221 Guerrero 
would emphasize that the split is not just “division about whether 
the [provision] covers this or that crime . . . it is, rather, pervasive 
disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to 
conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.”222 
This was the aspect of the residual clause that the Johnson Court 
repeatedly emphasized. The alternative route would be for  
Guerrero to show evidence that the law is enforced disproportion-
ately against a particular population, as was the case in  
Papachristou. In this case, however, there is no such evidence. 
Having fulfilled this threshold showing, the government 
would then be responsible for explaining why the provision pro-
vides adequate guidance for enforcement (separation of powers) 
as well as fair notice to individuals (due process) rather than be-
ing so standardless that its application results in impermissible 
“creation” of the law. In Guerrero, the Government would point to 
the shallow nature of the circuit split and suggest that the Third 
Circuit is merely an outlier. The Third Circuit’s brief discussion 
of whether the “particularly serious crime” exception is limited to 
 
 220 Alaka v Attorney General of the United States, 456 F3d 88, 104–05 (3d Cir 2006). 
 221 See In re N-A-M-, 24 I & N Dec 336, 337 (BIA 2007), affd 587 F3d 1052, 1056 (10th 
Cir 2009); Delgado v Holder, 648 F3d 1095, 1102–05 (9th Cir 2006); Gao v Holder, 595 F3d 
549, 556 (4th Cir 2010); Nethagani v Mukasey, 532 F3d 150, 155–57 (2d Cir 2009); Ali v 
Achim, 468 F3d 462, 469–70 (7th Cir 2006), cert granted, 551 US 1188 (2007), cert dis-
missed, 552 US 1085 (2007). The writ was dismissed due to settlement with the govern-
ment on a separate claim. See Michael McGarry, A Statute in Particularly Serious Need 
of Reinterpretation: The Particularly Serious Crime Exception to Withholding of Removal, 
51 BC L Rev 209, 212 n 23 (2010). 
 222 Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2560. 
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aggravated felonies supports this position, and the majority of cir-
cuits agree.223 This suggests that the circuit split may resolve it-
self with time when the Third Circuit eventually considers the 
legal question through the framework of agency deference. 
A court would then weigh the arguments and decide whether 
the provision was so standardless that either the separation of 
powers (judicial/executive legislation) or due process (fair notice) 
was violated by the conflicting adjudications (arbitrary enforce-
ment). In Guerrero, a court would likely deem invalidation of the 
“particularly serious crime” provision premature. Unlike the re-
sidual clause, courts are not disagreeing on a host of issues that 
indicate difficulty understanding what factors to consider when 
applying the law, as was the case with the residual clauses in 
Johnson and Dimaya. Rather, one circuit disagrees with all oth-
ers about how to define a particular aspect of the statute. 
An issue arises, however, when the standards for guidance 
laid out by a statute are so vague that virtually every aspect of 
the law must be considered by the Supreme Court. The ACCA’s 
residual clause is an example of such a provision. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and heard oral argument in at least sev-
enteen cases, all of which involved different issues regarding the 
ACCA’s residual clause.224 These repeated difficulties in applying 
the residual clause were clear evidence that the law was uncon-
stitutionally vague. In contrast, the Court has not heard oral ar-
gument in any case concerning the INA’s “particularly serious 
crime” provision.225 This is an indication that invalidation is 
premature. In other words, more percolation time is necessary to 
determine whether invalidation may be appropriate in a later 
case. Until there is evidence that the Supreme Court must con-
tinually reanalyze the statute in order to resolve recurring splits, 
invalidation is inappropriate.  
 
 223 See Alaka, 456 F3d at 104–05; Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Ali v 
Achim, No 06-1346, *16 (US filed July 11, 2007). For further analysis of the circuit split, 
see McGarry, 51 BC L Rev at 221–25 (cited in note 221). 
 224 A Westlaw search conducted in October 2019 lists seventeen Supreme Court cases 
including “ACCA” and “residual clause.” 
 225 A Westlaw search conducted in October 2019, lists two Supreme Court cases in-
cluding “particularly serious crime” and “INA.” See generally Sale v Haitian Centers Coun-
cil, Inc, 509 US 155 (1993) (mentioning the use of “particularly serious crime” in a US 
treaty); INS v Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 US 416 (1999) (briefly mentioning the use of “particu-
larly serious crime,” but not resolving its meaning). 
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As exhibited by the application of the Structure and Rights 
Approach to Guerrero, the proposed framework brings the ab-
stract exercise of the current vagueness test back to reality, ask-
ing judges to look at prior court decisions and the actual facts of 
the case to determine whether a vague provision is unconstitu-
tional. In doing so, the approach reconnects the vagueness frame-
work to its constitutional purpose of protecting both the separa-
tion of powers and due process as well as providing predictable 
and accessible guidance to lower courts. 
CONCLUSION 
A careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s vagueness doctrine 
reveals that vagueness has become unanchored from its constitu-
tional principles and unworkable for lower courts to apply. While 
the current approach focuses on due process with its two-pronged 
notice and arbitrary enforcement test, early courts and scholars 
considered vagueness as equally based on due process and sepa-
ration of powers. This Comment argues that the conceptual and 
practical bases for the early commentators’ conception of the doc-
trine are sound and accordingly suggests that separation of pow-
ers be formally reincorporated into the vagueness test. Although 
there is an element of separation of powers present in the arbi-
trary enforcement prong of the current test, clarifying the role of 
each constitutional concept is important for defining the limits of 
the doctrine.226 Such clarification is necessary given the criticisms 
that the test is subjective and difficult to apply, which are  
demonstrated by Guerrero.227 
The proposed Structure and Rights Approach disentangles 
the separation of powers and due process elements and orders 
them in a three-part framework. Each constitutional concept—
separation of powers, due process, and the hybrid of arbitrary en-
forcement—receives its own step. Moving through these steps se-
quentially guides courts in determining which, if any, constitu-
tional protection is violated by a vague statute. In doing so, the 
framework provides a test that is more predictable and consistent 
than the “I know it when I see it” quality of the current test. In 
 
 226 See Goldsmith, 30 Am J Crim L at 281–83 (cited in note 13) (describing how the 
Supreme Court “has often issued sweeping and contradictory statements on the subject” 
of the vagueness doctrine). 
 227 See note 56. 
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this way, the proposed approach minimizes the extent of consti-
tutional violations and facilitates effective review of vagueness 
decisions. 
 
